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The Persistence of Power and the Struggle for
Dialogic Standards in Postmodern Constitutional
Jurisprudence: Michelman, Habermas, and Civic
Republicanism
STEPHEN M. FELDMAN*
The cause is good, but the argument is not.

Jean-Francois Lyotard1

The civic republican revival has launched constitutional jurisprudence
into a new epoch. Since the 1950s, most constitutional scholars have
presumed that the American political system is pluralistic, with autono-

mous individuals struggling in the legislative arena to maximize the satisfaction of their preexisting private interests. These scholars have concentrated

on the Supreme Court's supposed antidemocratic or "countermajoritarian"
function: judicial review, according to these scholars, allows the Court to
overturn the substantive decisions issuing from democratic legislatures.2
The "new republicans," 3 however, reject these pluralist presumptions and
themes and instead focus on the nature of the political system itself.
Recalling Aristotelian political theory, they insist that constitutional jurisprudence must recognize the potential for virtuous citizens to engage in a

political dialogue that generates public values and identifies a common
good.'

Frank I. Michelman has pioneered this revival by confronting one

* Professor of Law, University of Tulsa. I thank Stanley Fish, Dennis Patterson, Cass
Sunstein, Mark Tushnet, Steve Winter, Tom Arnold, Larry Backer, Linda Lacey, John
Makdisi, Johnny Parker, and Laura Feldman for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. I
especially thank Frank Michelman for his provocative questions as well as his interest in and
comments on this article.
1.

JEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION:

A

REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE

66 (Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi trans., 1984).
2. See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (2d ed. 1986);
JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
3. New republicans include Bruce Ackerman, Linda Hirshman, and Cass Sunstein. See
Bruce Ackerman, ConstitutionalPolitics, ConstitutionalLaw, 99 YALE L.J. 453 (1989) [hereinafter Ackerman, ConstitutionalPolitics]; Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984); Linda R. Hirshman, The Virtue of Liberality in
American Communal Life, 88 MICH. L. REV. 983 (1990); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the
Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the
Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689 (1984) [hereinafter Sunstein, Naked Preferences]; Cass
R. Sunstein, Preferences and Politics, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3 (1991). For a criticism of

Sunstein's brand of republican constitutional theory, see Stephen M. Feldman, Exposing
Sunstein's Nakeq Preferences, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1335.
4. See Stephen M. Feldman, Republican Revival/Interpretive Turn, 1992 WiS. L. REV. 679,
689-90 (describing the influence of Aristotle on the republican revival).
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of the most troubling and persistent difficulties of civic republican thought:
the likelihood that the political dialogue will be closed to segments of the
community and therefore will generate so-called public values skewed
toward the interests of the already dominant social groups. 5
In his effort to overcome this acute weakness in the civic republican
tradition, Michelman emphasizes-more than most other new republicansthat politics should be an ongoing transformative dialogue between citizens.6
Indeed, Michelman focuses so firmly on the importance of dialogue and
deliberation that he tends to obscure other parts of traditional republican
thought, such as the common good and civic virtue. Unfortunately, this
postmodern7 transformation of civic republicanism creates another significant problem for Michelman: to evaluate political deliberations, we need
some critical standard, but we appear to have only dialogue-talk, talk,
and more talk.8 No normative viewpoint emerges from the dialogical
5. Cf. Stephen M. Feldman, Whose Common Good? Racism in the Political Community, 80
GEO. L.J. 1835, 1851-54 (1992) (describing how pervasive racism in American society can
undermine the political dialogue of civic republican theory).
For the development of Michelman's dialogic view of politics, see Frank Michelman,
Bringing the Law to Life: A Plea for Disenchantment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 256 (1989)
[hereinafter Michelman, A Plea]; Frank Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American
ConstitutionalArgument: The Case of Pornography Regulation, 56 TENN. L. REV. 291 (1989)
[hereinafter Michelman, Pornography Regulation]; Frank Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American ConstitutionalArgument: Voting Rights, 41 FLA. L. REV. 443 (1989) [hereinafter Michelman, Voting Rights]; Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988)
[hereinafter Michelman, Republic]; Frank Michelman, Personal But Not Split: Radin Versus
Rorty, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1783 (1990) [hereinafter Michelman, Not Split]; Frank Michelman,
Political Markets and Community Self-Determination: Competing Judicial Models of Local
Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145 (1977-1978) [hereinafter Michelman, Political
Markets]; Frank Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of SelfGovernment, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986) [hereinafter Michelman, Traces].
6. Compare Michelman, Traces, supra note 5, at 40 (viewing politics as an ongoing
transformative dialogue) and Michelman, Republic, supra note 5, at 1503-05, 1528-32 (attempting to articulate a critical standard for the ongoing transformative dialogue of politics) with
Ackerman, Constitutional Politics, supra note 3, at 484-86 (emphasizing rare moments of
constitutional transformation in American history) and Sunstein, Naked Preferences, supra
note 3, at 1690-91 (politics must be the pursuit of the common good, not private or naked
preferences). Michelman initially seemed to focus the dialogue in the forum of the courts,
see Michelman, Traces, supra note 5, at 74, but has subsequently underscored that the
political dialogue should occur in many forums. See Michelman, A Plea, supra note 5, at 266
(discussing political dialogue in the legislatures); Michelman, Republic, supra note 5, at 1531
(identifying many "arenas of potentially transformative dialogue").
7. This emphasis on extensive political dialogue is merely one manifestation of postmodernism. Postmodernism cannot be reduced to a single definition; perhaps paradoxically, any
effort to solidify postmodernism in a definition would be contrary to postmodernism itself.
For an extensive discussion of various manifestations and themes of postmodernism, see
Stephen M. Feldman, Diagnosing Power: Postmodernism in Legal Scholarship and Judicial
Practice (With an Emphasis on the Teague Rule Against New Rules in Habeas Corpus Cases),
88 Nw. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 1994).
8. Cf. Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L. REV. 167, 170-71 (1990)
(describing a "talk-talk genre" of legal thought).
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morass. Michelman, however, imaginatively responds in a Habermasian
(or neo-transcendental) 9 fashion to this possibly crucial flaw in the concept
of strong dialogic politics) 0 Just as Jurgen Habermas asks what conditions
are presupposed by the act of communication, Michelman asks what
conditions are presupposed by American constitutionalism.1" Michelman
concludes that for American constitutionalism to be possible, the political
dialogue must be open to all within the community and be undistorted by
the distribution and orientation of power. 1 2 This claimed presupposition
then provides the critical standard for evaluating the dialogue: political
deliberation is inadequate if the participation of any communal member is
coerced, dominated, excluded, or otherwise distorted by power.
This article questions whether Michelman's neo-transcendental reasoning supports his conclusion. Although I agree that politics should be
deliberative and that the community should strive to be as inclusive and
undistorted by power as possible,13 Michelman's neo-transcendental argument does not establish that nondistortion and communal inclusiveness
are necessary for American constitutionalism. In fact, postmodern theories suggest otherwise: power, in various forms (or forces), is so pervasive
and persistent that the political dialogue must always be, in part, distorted
and exclusive.' 4 Prejudices derived from communal traditions-manifestations of power-are prerequisites for communication and deliberation.
Our prejudices, in other words, enable us to understand, yet those same

9. See infra Part I.B.
10. I draw on Benjamin Barber's concept of strong democracy. See BENJAMIN R. BARBER,
STRONG DEMOCRACY 132-38 (1984).
11. C. Edwin Baker is another constitutional theorist who relies heavily on Habermas. See
C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1989).
12. Throughout this article, I shall refer to the significance of the concept of power in
postmodern thought. Some of my key sources on understanding power include the following:
JOHN BRENKMAN, CULTURE AND DOMINATION (1987); MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND
PUNISH (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH];
MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY (Robert Hurley trans., 1978) [hereinafter
FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY]; NANCY FRASER, UNRULY PRACTICES: POWER,
DISCOURSE, AND GENDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL THEORY (1989); THOMAS E. WARTENBERG, THE FORMS OF POWER (1990); RETHINKING POWER (Thomas E. Wartenberg ed.,

1992); see also Feldman, supra note 7 (diagnosing power in legal scholarship and judicial
practice).
13. Cf. Feldman, supra note 5, at 1876 (arguing that a reconstruction of constitutional and
political theory that addresses racism should be civic republican in nature); Feldman, supra
note 4, at 714-24 (describing how interpretivism can be synthesized with republicanism to
redress the republican threats of oppression and closure).
14. The following books are especially useful discussions of postmodernism: STEVEN
CONNOR, POSTMODERNIST CULTURE (1989); DAVID HARVEY, THE CONDITION OF POSTMODERNITY (1989); FREDRIC JAMESON, POSTMODERNISM, OR, THE CULTURAL LOGIC OF LATE
CAPITALISM (1991); LYOTARD, supra note 1; POSTMODERNISM AND SOCIETY (Roy Boyne &
Ali Rattansi eds., 1990); see also Feldman, supra note 7 (analyzing postmodernism in legal
scholarship and judicial practice).
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prejudices simultaneously and necessarily constrain our possibilities for
understanding. 5 Consequently, if a postmodern critical theory is possible
in constitutional jurisprudence, it must accept the necessity of community
and tradition, of prejudices and interests, and of distortion and exclusion.
A postmodern critical theory, in short, must remain steadfastly postmodern by recognizing the persistence of power: the critical force of such a
theory must arise from our (postmodern) reflexive understanding of the
social reconstruction of our communities, our traditions, and ourselves.
Part I of this article explores Michelman's civic republican conception of
politics and his neo-transcendental approach to the problem of dialogic
critique. 6 To facilitate understanding this approach, Part I includes a
brief discussion of the relationship between Jirgen Habermas's neotranscendental theory of communicative action and Hans-Georg Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics. Part II begins by exploring how
postmodern theories, including philosophical hermeneutics, reveal weaknesses in Habermas's theory that are mirrored in and ultimately defeat
Michelman's effort to articulate and legitimize a critical norm in constitutional jurisprudence. 7 In particular, Michelman underestimates the persistence of power and thus fails to realize how this postmodern insight
deflects his neo-transcendental delineation of the preconditions of American constitutionalism. Part II proceeds to discuss how Michelman eventually acknowledges this postmodern challenge to his theory, only then to
suggest that certain prereflective cognitive structures might create the
possibility for undistorted and inclusive political dialogue.1 8 As developed
by Michelman, however, this response to postmodernism seriously undermines the core of his strong dialogic politics. Consequently, Part III
suggests an alternative approach to resolving the struggle for dialogic
standards in constitutional jurisprudence.' 9
I. MICHELMAN'S STRUGGLE FOR DIALOGIC STANDARDS
A. MICHELMAN'S DIALOGIC POLITICS

Although Michelman currently tends to emphasize the dialogic component of the civic republican tradition, he previously relied heavily on other
elements of the tradition. In one of his earliest articles on the subject, he
defined the republican model of politics by its commitment to the possibil15. See Feldman, supra note 4, at 707-09; Stephen M. Feldman, The New Metaphysics: The
Interpretive Turn in Jurisprudence, 76 IowA L. REV. 661 (1991) [hereinafter Feldman, New
Metaphysics].
16. See infra text accompanying notes 20-80.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 81-111.

18. See infra text accompanying notes 112-147.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 148-182.
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°
ity of objective common goods or public values. While Michelman no
longer treats the common good as definitive, he still continues to refer to it
' '22 in republican
as an objective value 21 or as an "objectivist moment
politics. He has recognized, however, that throughout history, many political leaders and theorists have attempted to justify political oppression and
subjugation by drawing on civic republican themes, particularly the concept of an objective common good. For example, a political leader might
claim that her supposedly privileged vision of an objective common good
23
legitimates the oppression of all those who do not share the same vision.
To avoid such potential for domination, Michelman has attempted to
expropriate the dialogical component of civic republicanism, using it to
24
develop a postmodern deliberative and jurisgenerative political theory.

20. Michelman wrote: "The ...public-interest model depends at bottom on a belief in
the reality-or at least the possibility-of public or objective values and ends for human
action." Michelman, PoliticalMarkets, supra note 5, at 149.
21. See Michelman, Voting Rights, supra note 5, at 446, 448, 451 (referring to the common
good as objective or as objectively discoverable).
22. Michelman, Traces, supra note 5, at 40.
23. For example, Aristotle argued that the best regime is the aristocracy-a government
of the few in pursuit of the common good. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, at bk. VII-VIII (Carnes
Lord trans., 1984). In The Federalist, Publius suggested that certain individuals are more
capable than others of perceiving the true interests of the people-the objective common
good-and those most virtuous people ideally should be elected to governmental offices.
E.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 82 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); THE

FEDERALIST No. 57, at 350 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); cf. MORTON
WHITE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 257-72 (1978) [hereinafter WHITE,
AMERICAN REVOLUTION] (discussing the elitism of American revolutionaries); MORTON

WHITE, PHILOSOPHY, THE FEDERALIST, AND THE CONSTITUTION 126-27 (1987) (discussing the

elitism of the framers). Then, pushing this argument even further, Publius reasoned that
some groups of people-women and African-American slaves-are so incapable of perceiving the public good that they can be justifiably excluded from the deliberations within the
political community. See THE FEDERALIST No. 54, at 336-41 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961); cf. WHITE, AMERICAN REVOLUTION, supra, at 266-67 (identifying elitism

as an important element leading to disenfranchisement of many groups in the Constitution).
Michelman writes: "One can hardly fail to notice how easily the 'republican' lineupsubstantive common good, politically grounded rights, deliberative process, political agency
constitutive of personal freedom-coalesces around a solidaristic, and concomitantly hierarchical, sociological vision." Michelman, Voting Rights, supra note 5, at 456; see Feldman,
supra note 4, at 690-91, 693-95, 698-700 (describing the hierarchical societal structures
embodied by the civic republican tradition).
24. According to Michelman:
[The civic republican tradition] has elements of teleology, objectivism, and abstraction that seem finally incompatible with the modern dialogic attitude I have been
trying to describe. The tradition's flawed exemplification of dialogic possibility
may, I suggest, help explain both its current resurgence in political discourse and
the suspicion with which that resurgence is met.
Michelman, Traces, supra note 5, at 36. Thus, Michelman seeks "to refocus constitutional
vision on a republican notion of jurisgenerative politics as the crux of political freedom."
Michelman, Republic, supra note 5, at 1524.
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Michelman argues that dialogic politics, as he conceives of it, is both
normative and pragmatic. Dialogic politics is normative because it construes politics to be a contest over questions of values-not questions of
private preferences. 25 This normative contest generates or produces public values and legal norms: politics, in short, is jurisgenerative.26 Indeed,
according to Michelman, politics "is the only avenue by which public
values ...might possibly be determinable and accessible., 27 Citizens confront other citizens, challenging their "linguistically encoded self-understandings, sensibilities, and ways of knowing." 2 8 Citizens thus transform
themselves as well as transform the community as they generate public
values: "politics is a field in which persons reciprocally exercise their
capacities for changing and becoming by and through communicative
29
relations.
When Michelman argues that dialogic politics is also pragmatic, he
refers to the neo-pragmatism of the postmodern interpretive turn.3 ° He
cites, for example, to Richard Rorty and Richard Bernstein (discussing
Hans-Georg Gadamer and Rorty), not to more traditional pragmatists
such as Charles Sanders Peirce or John Dewey.3 1 Thus, Michelman's
description of dialogic politics often strongly resembles a type of postmodern interpretivism, 3 2 especially the philosophical hermeneutics of Gadamer.33 Gadamer argues that prejudices and interests derived from tradition
25. Michelman, A Plea, supra note 5, at 257.
26. Cf Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narra-

tive, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 11 (1983) (introducing the term "jurisgenerative"); Michelman,
Republic, supra note 5, at 1502, 1524 (politics producing law that is experienced as valid and

legitimate).
27. Michelman, A Plea, supra note 5, at 256.
28. Michelman, Not Split, supra note 5, at 1786.
29. Michelman, Voting Rights, supra note 5, at 485.

30. The "interpretive turn" refers to a transition in late twentieth century intellectual

thought in which various theorists began to focus on aspects of interpretation. See Feldman,
supra note 4, at 701-14.

31. See, e.g., Michelman, A Plea, supra note 5, at 258 n.12 (citing Rorty); Michelman,
Traces, supra note 5, at 32 n.156 (citing Bernstein and Rorty). For prominent examples of
postmodern neo-pragmatism and interpretivism, see RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM: SCIENCE, HERMENEUTICS, AND PRAXIS (1983); RICHARD RORTY,
PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979).

32. I am distinguishing between postmodern and modern forms of interpretivism or
hermeneutics. Postmodern interpretivism emphasizes the nonfoundational quality of interpretation and understanding, while modernist forms of interpretivism or hermeneutics focus
on identifying methods for the correct interpretation of texts. Correct, in the modernist
sense, means objectively correct: the text is conceived as an object that is separate and
independent from, yet somehow accessible to, the perceiving subject. Feldman, New Metaphysics, supra note 15, at 682.
33. See generally HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (Joel Weinsheimer &

Donald G. Marshall trans., 2d rev. ed. 1989). For excellent analyses of Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics, see GEORGIA WARNKE, GADAMER:

HERMENEUTICS,

TRADITION, AND

THE PERSISTENCE OF POWER
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(including the culture and history of our community) simultaneously en34
able and constrain interpretation and understanding. We can never step
outside the horizon of our prejudices and interests to find some firmer
foundation for understanding.3 5 In short, we are always and already
interpreting.3 6 Moreover, even though we can never escape our prejudices
A READING OF TRUTH
hermeneutics and its
relation to jurisprudence, see Feldman, New Metaphysics, supra note 15, at 681-98; cf.

REASON (1987); JOEL C. WEINSHEIMER, GADAMER'S HERMENEUTICS:
AND METHOD (1985). For a discussion of Gadamer's philosophical

Drucilla Cornell, Toward a Modern/Postmodern Reconstruction of Ethics, 133 U. PA. L. REV.

291, 298 (1985) (building on Gadamer and Habermas in an effort to reconstruct ethics in
law).
Because of the richness of Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics and the ambiguity of the
term "postmodernism," whether Gadamer is characterized as being postmodern is controversial. Some suggest that Gadamer's antifoundationalism renders him postmodern, e.g.,
CONNOR, supra note 14, at 134; G.B. MADISON, Beyond Seriousness and Frivolity: A Gadamerian Response to Deconstruction, in THE HERMENEUTICS OF POSTMODERNITY 106-08 (1988),

while others argue that Gadamer's belief in truth (though antifoundational) and his emphasis on tradition render him modern, e.g., RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, What is the Difference that
Makes a Difference?

Gadamer, Habermas, and Rorty, in PHILOSOPHICAL PROFILES:
58, 83-84 (1986) [hereinafter BERNSTEIN, The Difference]. For

ESSAYS IN PRAGMATIC MODE

discussions of the difficulty of defining postmodernism, see RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, Introduction to THE NEW CONSTELLATION: THE ETHICAL-POLITICAL HORIZONS OF MODERNITY/
POSTMODERNITY 1, 11 (1991) [hereinafter THE NEW CONSTELLATION]; CONNOR, supra note
14, at 48-51; JAMESON, supra note 14, at xxii.
Michelman argues that "the republican tradition is, on one reading, an historical projection of contemporary rebellion against a modern ethical dilemma that has been called the
Cartesian Anxiety: the sense of entrapment between nihilism on the one hand, and domination on the other." Michelman, Traces, supra note 5, at 24 (footnotes omitted). Most
postmodern interpretivists likewise would argue that interpretivism is an effort to overcome
this Cartesian Anxiety. See Feldman, supra note 4, at 701-14; Feldman, New Metaphysics,
supra note 15, at 661-62, 678-79, 681-83. Richard Bernstein coined the term "Cartesian
Anxiety." BERNSTEIN, supra note 31, at 16-20.
34. With regard to how prejudices enable understanding, Gadamer writes: "[T]he historicity of our existence entails that prejudices, in the literal sense of the word, constitute the
initial directedness of our whole ability to experience. Prejudices are biases of our openness
to the world."

Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem, in

(J. Bleicher ed. & trans. 1980) [hereinsimilarly writes that "already-in-place
interpretive constructs are a condition of consciousness." Stanley Fish, Dennis Martinez and

JOSEF BLEICHER, CONTEMPORARY HERMENEUTICS 133
after CONTEMPORARY HERMENEUTICS]. Stanley Fish

the Uses of Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1773, 1795 (1987) [hereinafter Fish, Dennis Martinez]; see
also Stanley Fish, Change, 86 S. ATLANTIC Q. 423, 424 (1987); cf. J.M. Balkin, Ideology as
Constraint, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1138 (1991) (reviewing ANDREW ALTMAN, CRITICAL
LEGAL STUDIES: A LIBERAL CRITIQUE (1990)) (arguing that ideology constrains yet makes

legal doctrine intelligible).
For a discussion of the development of philosophical hermeneutics and its implications for
jurisprudence, see Feldman, supra note 4, at 701-24; Feldman, New Metaphysics, supra note
15, at 675-98.
35. Gadamer uses the metaphor of the "horizon" to communicate the notion that one's
possibilities for understanding are limited. "The horizon is the range of vision that includes
everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point." GADAMER, supra note 33, at
302; see id. at 306-07 (discussing the constantly changing nature of the horizon).
36. For discussions of the universality of hermeneutics, see RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, From
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and interests, which are derived from tradition, tradition nonetheless
constantly changes because the process of interpretation itself continually
questions and reconstructs tradition, thus transforming our prejudices and
interests.3 7
Michelman similarly writes:
[T]he dialogic conception of politics... envisions political argument as a
kind of ethical argument that is culturally and historically situated and
conditioned but that also proceeds without foundations. Pragmatic political argument is animated and constrained by a consciousness of its
situation within, and answerability to, a public normative culture and
history-within and to, if you like, a normative practice.... [But] if
pragmatic political argument does locate itself within a public normative
history, it also adopts a critical and always potentially transformative
attitude toward that history. It regards that history as always containing
resources that can be applied to its own critical re-examination and,
therefore, as always being ripe for the transformative exercise of what
has been called interpretation, or internal development, or recollective
38
imagination.

Gadamer argues further that language is the "medium" 39 of tradition
and understanding: "Language is the fundamental mode of operation of
our being-in-the-world and the all-embracing form of the constitution of
the world."" Michelman, again in a similar vein, writes: "For the modern
pragmatist, conceptualisms are manners of speaking, and manners of
speaking both make and reflect world-shaping habits of thought. They are,
on a pragmatist understanding, matrices of linguistically constructed
reality."" 1 These parallels between Michelman's dialogic politics and interpretivism do not escape Michelman's notice. Thus, he expressly acknowlHermeneutics to Praxis, in PHILOSOPHICAL PROFILES:

ESSAYS IN A PRAGMATIC MODE, supra

note 33, at 94; Gadamer, supra note 34.
37. Gadamer explains that: "[t]radition is not simply a permanent precondition; rather,
we produce it ourselves inasmuch as we understand, participate in the evolution of tradition,
and hence further determine it ourselves." GADAMER, supra note 33, at 293. Gadamer adds:
"Even the most genuine and pure tradition does not persist because of the inertia of what
once existed. It needs to be affirmed, embraced, cultivated." Id. at 281.
38. Michelman, A Plea, supra note 5, at 257-58 (footnotes omitted); see Michelman,
Traces, supra note 5, at 31-32 (discussing conflicting demands of ethical situation and free
subjectivity in contemporary social theory).
39. GADAMER, supra note 33, at 384.
40. Gadamer, supra note 34, at 128; see also id. at 136-37. Although language is the
medium of tradition, tradition is not merely a matter of words. Just as Julia Annas writes
about Alasdair Maclntyre's notion of tradition, one might state that Gadamer's tradition is
"socially embodied" or "embodied in various forms of social life." Julia Annas, Maclntyre
on Traditions, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 388, 388-89 (1989).
41. Michelman, Not Split, supra note 5, at 1785.
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edges the affinity between his account of politics and Ronald Dworkin's
interpretive account of adjudication.4 2
Apparently as intended, Michelman develops the dialogic components
of civic republicanism so completely that it obscures what he had called
the objectivist moments of the republican tradition, such as the common
good. Civic republicanism becomes, in his hands, a form of postmodern
interpretivism: "a certain conception of jurisgenerative politics as an
4 3 Unhistorically situated, recollective process of normative contention."
surprisingly, then, Michelman encounters the primary dilemma of Gadam44
er's philosophical hermeneutics (and postmodern theories in general).
Many critics argue that Gadamer fails to provide or elucidate any critical
standards for evaluating different interpretations of the same text. If, as
Gadamer insists, we always interpret from within the horizon of our
prejudices and communal traditions, then, ask the critics, how can we ever
judge one interpretation as better or worse than another? Philosophical
hermeneutics and other postmodern theories, in other words, appear to
push us toward a relativism in which there is no truth or falsity, no right or
wrong; there are only different perspectives.4 5
Michelman realizes that he must face this same difficulty: the problem
of critique or normative standards. As Michelman states, his vision of
dialogic politics threatens to subvert "the entire practice of judicial reviewimplying its total subordination to popular politics. ' 46 If politics is no
more than a transformative dialogue continuing forever into the future,
then on what grounds can the Supreme Court ever legitimately step in to
strike down a legislative act as unconstitutional?

42. See Michelman, Republic, supra note 5, at 1514. For Dworkin's most complete account
of his interpretive position, see RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).
43. Michelman, Republic, supra note 5, at 1525.

44. One might argue that the overriding question for postmodernism is critique. See
RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, Serious Play: The Ethical-PoliticalHorizon of Derrida, in THE NEW
CONSTELLATION, supra note 33, at 172, 191; Dennis Patterson, PostmodernismlFerninism/
Law, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 254, 305 (1992).
45. See, e.g., BERNSTEIN, supra note 36, at 105-09; E.D. HIRSCH, VALIDITY IN INTERPRETATION 41-44 (1967); WEINSHEIMER, supra note 33, at 40-59; Michael Moore, The Interpretive

Turn in Modem Theory: A Turn for the Worse?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 871, 924-27 (1989).

theorists who consider themselves postmodernists also recognize the problem
within postmodernism: "While many reject the modernist 'view from nowhere,'
tion whether postmodernism would not lead us to the equally problematic
everywhere.' Are coherent theory and politics possible within a postmodern

Many

of critique
they ques'view from
position?"

Linda J. Nicholson, Introduction to FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM 1, 9 (Linda J. Nicholson ed.,
1990)

[hereinafter FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM].

For a discussion of how postmodernism

sometimes tends to be conservative (especially in the works of Lyotard and Foucault), see
MADAN SARUP, AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO POST-STRUCTURALISM AND POSTMODERNISM

140 (1989).
46. Michelman, Republic, supra note 5, at 1525.
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B. MICHELMAN, HABERMAS, AND CRITIQUE

Many other constitutional theorists have faced the problem of critique
in one form or another. Some of them surrendered to relativism (or
nihilism), 47 but most retreated to some type of foundationalism, seeking
standards in some supposedly external and objective source, such as natural law. 48 Michelman's resourceful alternative is to structure an argument
that parallels Habermas's attempt to supplement interpretivism with a
meta-hermeneutic critical standard. 49 Habermas agrees that Gadamer
fails to provide for the possibility of critique in his philosophical herme-

47. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373 (1982). For a
discussion of how metaphysical antirealism leads to relativistic positions in constitutional
jurisprudence, see Feldman, New Metaphysics, supra note 15, at 691-92.
48. Cf. ELY, supra note 2, at 1-72 (criticizing several different approaches to grounding
constitutional interpretation on some external and objective source). For a discussion of
how metaphysical realism and antirealism are manifested in these two opposed reactions to
the problem of critique, see Feldman, New Metaphysics, supra note 15, at 690-92.
49. See Thomas McCarthy, Rationality and Relativism: Habermas's 'Overcoming' of Hermeneutics, in HABERMAS: CRITICAL DEBATES 57, 57-58 (John B. Thompson & David Held eds.,
1982) [hereinafter HABERMAS: CRITICAL DEBATES] (arguing that Habermas developed his
theory of communicative action because of the supposed relativistic implications of Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics); John B. Thompson, Universal Pragmatics, in HABERMAS:
CRITICAL DEBATES, supra, at 116, 116 (arguing that Habermas intends to provide "a
normative foundation for critical theory"). Michelman does not directly follow Habermas in
the sense that he does not often expressly cite to Habermas in the key parts of Law's
Republic. Although Michelman occasionally cites Habermas, Michelman more often cites to
Seyla Benhabib. Compare Michelman, Republic, supra note 5, at 1526 n.135 (citing Habermas) with id. at 1526-27 nn.136-38 (citing Benhabib). Benhabib, however, focuses and critically builds on Habermas's theory of communicative action. See generally SEYLA BENHABIB,
CRITIQUE, NORM, AND UTOPIA (1986).
Some of Habermas's key works are JURGEN HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERESTS (Jeremy J. Shapiro trans., 1971) [hereinafter HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE]; JORGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1975) [hereinafter HABERMAS,
LEGITIMATION CRISIS]; JUJRGEN HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE
ACTION (Christian Lenhardt & Shiery W. Nicholsen trans., 1990) [hereinafter HABERMAS,
MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS]; JURGEN HABERMAS, THE PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE OF MODERNITY (Frederick Lawrence trans., 1987) [hereinafter HABERMAS, PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE]; 1 JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (Thomas McCarthy
trans., 1984) [hereinafter 1 HABERMAS, THE THEORY]; 2 JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY
OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1987) [hereinafter 2 HABERMAS,
THE THEORY]; Jirgen Habermas, A Reply to My Critics, in HABERMAS: CRITICAL DEBATES,

supra, at 219 [hereinafter Habermas, A Reply]; Jirgen Habermas, The Hermeneutic Claim to
Universality, in CONTEMPORARY HERMENEUTICS, supra note 34, at 181 [Habermas, Hermeneutic Claim]; Jirgen Habermas, WHAT IS UNIVERSAL PRAGMATICS?, in COMMUNICATION

1 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1979).
The best synthesis and analysis of Habermas's work is THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE CRITICAL
THEORY OF JURGEN HABERMAS (1978). More recent syntheses are DAVID INGRAM, HABERMAS AND THE DIALECTIC OF REASON (1987); STEPHEN K. WHITE, THE RECENT WORK OF
JURGEN HABERMAS (1988).
AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY
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neutics; nonetheless, Habermas believes that we must retain Gadamer's
interpretivist insights even while we struggle to add critical bite.5 °
Habermas attempts to develop critical standards in two steps. He begins
by dividing society into two realms: first, a "lifeworld" of symbolic reproduction, and second, economic and administrative systems of material reproduction. 5 ' According to Habermas, in late capitalist societies, the strategic
rationality that is necessary for successful action within the economic and
administrative systems "colonizes" the lifeworld. 5 2 Rationality within the
lifeworld, however, should be oriented toward mutual understanding, not
toward a strategy of personal success. The colonization of the lifeworld
therefore entails that the mechanisms or processes of material reproduction distort the processes of symbolic reproduction, undermining understanding and communicative action.5 3 Hence, to Habermas, the first step
to the identification of critical standards is to recognize the possibility of
untangling the lifeworld of symbolic reproduction from the systemic processes of material reproduction.
Habermas's second step is to find actual critical standards within the
realm of symbolic reproduction. Significantly, Habermas does not suggest
54
that we can somehow escape the lifeworld in order to ground critique,
but rather he maintains that the mechanisms of mutual understanding

50. See BERNSTEIN, The Difference, supra note 33, at 69 (asserting that Habermas agrees

with Gadamer, that "we cannot escape from our own horizon in seeking to understand what
appears to be alien to us."). Habermas writes: "[Tlhe hermeneutic insight is certainly
correct, viz., the insight that understanding-no matter how controlled it may be-cannot
simply leap over the interpreter's relationships to tradition." Jirgen Habermas, A Review of
Gadamer's Truth and Method, in UNDERSTANDING AND SOCIAL INQUIRY 335, 357 (Fred
Dallmayr & Thomas McCarthy eds., 1977).
51. See, e.g., 1 HABERMAS, THE THEORY, supra note 49, at 340-43; 2 HABERMAS, THE
THEORY, supra note 49, at 150-52. The separation of a rationalized lifeworld from rational-

ized economic and administrative systems is, in part, Habermas's attempt to elaborate
Weber's thesis that western civilization has become disenchanted. "The process of disenchantment comes to fruition ... in the differentiated structures of a rationalized lifeworld, where
actions are increasingly coordinated by consensual agreement rather than normative
prescriptions." WHITE, supra note 49, at 106; see Stephen M. Feldman, An Interpretation of
Max Weber's Theory of Law: Metaphysics, Economics, and the Iron Cage of ConstitutionalLaw,
16 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 205, 208 (1991) (on Weber and disenchantment).

52. Habermas concludes that "processes of monetarization and bureaucratization penetrate the core domains of cultural reproduction, social integration, and socialization. Forms
of interaction shaped by these media cannot encroach upon realms of life that by their
function are dependent on action oriented to mutual understanding without the appearance
of pathological side effects." HABERMAS, PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE, supra note 49, at 355;
see also 2 HABERMAS, THE THEORY, supra note 49, at 304-05; WHITE, supra note 49, at
107-13.
53. Habermas also discusses the cultural impoverishment of the lifeworld insofar as

everyday consciousness becomes fragmented and unable to use the overwhelming amounts
of information that are currently available. See WHITE, supra note 49, at 116-18.
54. See HABERMAS, PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE, supra note 49, at 298.
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themselves entail certain critical standards once the lifeworld is purified of
the distortions arising from strategic (systems) rationality. Habermas develops his approach at this second step by drawing upon Immanuel Kant's
transcendental argument. Philosophers before Kant-particularly the epistemological skeptic, David Hume-had argued that for knowledge to be
possible, the objects of an external world must shape human experience.5 5
Kant's "Copernican Revolution" reversed this schema: he argued that
humans impose form and structure on the objects or phenomena of
experience. Certain structures or categories are inherent to and therefore
shape all human experience and thought. Knowledge is possible, according to Kant, exactly because the categories are necessary preconditions of
human experience. Kant's epistemological project was then to identify the
specific categories that were a priori conditions of experience.5 6
Habermas appropriates the structure of this Kantian transcendental
argument in his effort to find critical standards within the lifeworld of
symbolic reproduction or, in other words, in an attempt to respond to the
apparent lack of critical standards in Gadamer's vision of communication
and interpretation. Initially, Habermas constructed pure transcendental
arguments,5 7 but in reacting to criticisms of that approach, he reformulated his method, calling it now a "rational reconstruction." 5 8 The supposed difference between a pure transcendental argument and a rational
reconstruction is that the former seeks a priori categories or claims (of
knowledge or communication), while the latter seeks categories or claims
that are empirically testable.5 9 Nonetheless, many commentators have
55. Hume argued that one cannot know the objects of the external world, or in Kantian
language, that synthetic a priori knowledge is impossible.

On the one hand, we can be

certain about analytical reasoning such as mathematics, but this form of reasoning cannot
provide information about the external world. On the other hand, experience or sense
perception can provide information about the external world, but it cannot provide the
certainty necessary for true knowledge. David Hume, An Enquiry ConcerningHuman Understanding, in THE ENGLISH PHILOSOPHERS FROM BACON TO MILL 598-607, 678-83 (Edwin A.

Burtt ed., 1939). Hume gives this example: If we repeatedly hit one billiard ball into a
second, which then rolls away, we believe that the first ball "causes" the second to roll away.
But Hume insists that we cannot be certain that the first ball causes the second to roll or
even that the second will always roll away. In other words, it is not logically necessary that
the second ball will roll away; every so-called effect is a distinct event from its so-called
cause. Id. at 600.
56. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, in KANT SELECTIONS 1, 3-5, 14-27, 43-66
(Theodore M. Greene ed., 1929); cf. Feldman, supra note 51, at 209-12 (discussing the
relationship between Kant's and Weber's metaphysics).
57. See HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE, supra note 49, at 314; Thompson, supra note 49, at
118-19.
58. Habermas, A Reply, supra note 49, at 234; HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS, supra
note 49, at 31; see BERNSTEIN, The Difference, supra note 33, at 72-73; WHITE, supra note 49,

at 10, 27-29, 129-30.
59. See HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS, supra note 49, at 31-32; Habermas, A Reply,
supra note 49, at 234.
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emphasized that the basic structure of Habermas's argument remains
transcendental, or as I shall call it, neo-transcendental. 6"
Thus, Habermas argues that we should not look to some external source
for critical standards, but instead should look to the inherent pattern or
structure of communicative action itself. Just as Kant constructed his
transcendental argument within the supposedly noncontingent edifice or
starting point of human experience (delineating the preconditions of that
experience), Habermas constructs his neo-transcendental argument within
the supposedly unadulterated lifeworld of symbolic reproduction, disentangled from material reproduction. Habermas maintains that communicative action in the lifeworld necessarily presupposes three validity claims:
sincerity, truth, and normative legitimacy.6" The possibility of truth and
normative legitimacy, in turn, presupposes a rational consensus reached
free of coercion, domination, and other distortive effects of power,62 or in
other words, a consensus achieved in an "ideal speech situation."6 3 Nancy
Fraser suggests that in Habermas's ideal speech situation, "the 'power'
that structures discourse [must] be symmetrical, non-hierarchical, and
hence reciprocal.",64 To Habermas, then, the presupposition of an ideal
speech situation in communicative action grounds (or supports the possibility of) truth and normative legitimacy and thus engenders social and
political critique. Therefore, we do not need to find some external source
to ground critical theory; we need only to recognize the conditions necessary for communicative action to occur in the first place.
65
Michelman first uses a neo-transcendental or Habermasian approach
in his 1986 foreword to the Harvard Law Review, 66 which explores the

60. See, e.g., McCarthy, supra note 49, at 61-62 (referring to Habermas's approach as
"quasi-transcendental"); cf. BERNSTEIN, The Difference, supra note 33, at 74-75 (arguing that
Habermas's theories are not empirically refutable and thus do not fit a scientific model).
61. See 1 HABERMAS, THE THEORY, supra note 49, at 137, 306-08; McCarthy, supra note
49, at 65-68.
62. My concept of power in this context is much broader than the concept of power that
Habermas typically uses. For Habermas, power consists of the medium within the administrative system (while money is the medium within the economic system). See WHITE, supra note
49, at 100-01, 107. For a discussion of a broader conception of power, see infra notes
101-109 and accompanying text.
63. Habermas, Hermeneutic Claim, supra note 49, at 206; see HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION
CRISIS, supra note 49, at 107-08. See generally Michelman, Republic, supra note 5, at 1526
(describing Habermas's ideal speech situation). On the determination of sincerity, see
WHITE, supra note 49, at 28, 33, 147.
64. FRASER, supra note 12, at 47.
65. Michelman apparently attempts a Habermasian rational reconstruction, not a purely
transcendental argument seeking a priori principles. See, e.g., Michelman, Republic, supra
note 5, at 1537 (asserting that one can offer only "an argument, not a demonstration, about
the Constitution's meaning"); supra text accompanying notes 55-60 (discussing Habermas's
transition from transcendental arguments to rational reconstructions).
66. Michelman, Traces, supra note 5.
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relationship between freedom and self-government. He argues that in the
Harringtonian civic republican tradition, three "objectivist momentscommon good, civic virtue, and legality-... are conditions of the possibility of self-government, for human beings situated in society and history.
.. The objectivist moments, however problematic, are what must be true,
or possible, if self-government is true or possible., 67 Then, in the conclusion, when Michelman reiterates his theme of freedom and self-government, he writes that "freedom understood as self-government involves
constant mediations between objectivity and subjectivity.", 6 Thus, selfgovernment requires, in part, a constant mediation between the common
good (on the objective side) and dialogue (on the subjective side).69
When Michelman wrote the foreword, he already had begun to emphasize dialogic politics, but he still viewed the common good as an integral
part of the civic republican tradition. Two years later, however, his contribution to a Yale Law Journal symposium on the civic republican revival
disclosed a firmer commitment to dialogic politics. As this latter article,
entitled Law's Republic,7" confronts the problem of critique that inevitably
surfaces in different forms of postmodern interpretivism or dialogism, the
neo-transcendental structure of Michelman's argument becomes central to
his thought. Michelman does not believe that any external and objective
source can ground criticism in American constitutional law, but he also is
unwilling to accept relativism. Thus, he asks the Habermasian neotranscendental question: What conditions are necessary to make American
constitutionalism possible?
Just as Habermas constructed his neo-transcendental argument within
the supposedly pure lifeworld of symbolic reproduction, Michelman constructs his neo-transcendental argument within the edifice of American
constitutionalism. American constitutionalism, as Michelman defined it in
Law's Republic, rests on two commitments-self-government and government by law-which create a problematic tension at the core of the
American governmental system. Michelman thus writes:
[M]y strategy has been to start with the actual, problematic experience of
the dual commitments (I trust that the experience is widely shared by
readers) and from it derive a normative idea of dialogic constitutionalism
as consistent, at least, with this problematic experience. That derivation
is now essentially complete, and its crucial result is stipulation (ii). But
stipulation (ii), then, does not occupy the status of an independent
assertion, standing on its own bottom so to speak, about actual or
67. Id. at 47.
68. Id. at 73.
69. See id. at 47.
70. Michelman, Republic, supra note 5.
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possible experience. Its status is rather that of an inference about what
as we do not give up the historic
we have to regard as possible as long
71
American idea of constitutionalism.
Michelman's "stipulation (ii)" states that "there exists a set of prescriptive
social and procedural conditions such that one's undergoing, under those
conditions, such a dialogic modulation of one's understandings is not
considered or experienced as coercive, or invasive, or otherwise a violation
of one's identity or freedom., 72 That is, similar to Habermas's ideal
speech situation, stipulation (ii) requires that an understanding be achieved
free from coercion, domination, or any other distortive effects of power.
Stipulation (ii) consequently is the critical standard that Michelman
needs to save his notion of jurisgenerative politics from relativism. He
elaborates this standard by relating stipulation (ii) to a conception of the
political self. He states: "[S]tipulation (ii) apparently describes ... a pro-

cess of personal self-revision under social-dialogic stimulation., 73 This
political self "necessarily obtains its self-critical resources from, and tests
its current understandings against, understandings from beyond its own
pre-critical life and experience, which is to say communicatively, by reaching for the perspectives of other and different persons., 74 He culminates
his elucidation of the critical norm by adding that "the pursuit of political
freedom through law depends on 'our' constant reach for inclusion of the
other, of the hitherto excluded-which in practice means bringing to
legal-doctrinal presence 75the hitherto absent voices of emergently selfconscious social groups."
Michelman uses Bowers v. Hardwick76 to illustrate the critical bite of
stipulation (ii). In Hardwick, the Supreme Court held that the state of
Georgia's criminal conviction of Hardwick for performing homosexual
sodomy in his own home did not violate his constitutional right of privacy.7 7
Michelman persuasively argues that the Court's decision violates his critical norm of nondistortion and inclusiveness: Georgia effectively rejected
homosexuality as a way of life and thus impaired the ability of homosexuals
to participate fully as citizens in the political community. 78 The state
coercively excluded homosexuals from the political dialogue that is central
to civic republican government. Furthermore, according to Michelman,

71. Id. at 1527-28 (footnotes omitted).
72. Id. at 1526-27.
73. Id. at 1528.
74. Id.

75. Id. at 1529.
76. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).

77. Id. at 195-96.
78. Michelman, Republic, supra note 5, at 1534.
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the illegitimacy of Hardwick becomes even more pronounced once we
recognize that privacy should not represent "an attitude of hostility towards public life and a need for refuge from and protection against public
power."' 79 Instead, privacy and citizenship must be closely linked: Michelman's critical standard underscores that the Georgia law impairs citizenship by denying homosexuals the open personal associations and dialogue
that enable one to test and transform one's political self."°
II. THE PERSISTENCE OF POWER
A. POSTMODERN PROBLEMS FOR MICHELMAN

Michelman, like Habermas, fails to appreciate the persistence of power
and its distortive effects. Following Habermas, Michelman avows to accept the postmodern insight that we cannot escape our horizons to find
solid ground for critique, yet he nonetheless claims to identify a critical
norm that firmly supports American constitutionalism. But neither Michelman nor Habermas can so easily evade the distortive effects of power:
their neo-transcendental arguments ultimately reduce to albeit sophisticated attempts to resurrect modernist objectivism."1 Michelman thus inadvertently reintroduces problems that he had attempted to avoid by
developing civic republicanism into a strong form of dialogic politics.8 "
Habermas's and Michelman's arguments share two crucial difficulties.
First, beginning with Habermas, the prerequisite for Habermas's neotranscendental argument is his separation of symbolic from material reproduction. 3 The existence of a lifeworld of the symbolic supposedly provides,
in effect, a noncontingent origin or starting point that triggers, and is
indeed necessary for, a neo-transcendental analysis-communicative action becomes a thing (or thing-in-itself) that one can analyze or rationally
reconstruct in order to delineate its presuppositions. But Habermas's
79. Id.
80. Michelman writes: "The argument forges the link between privacy and citizenship. It
attacks the Georgia law for denying or impairing citizenship by exposing to the hazards of
criminal prosecution the intimate associations through which personal moral understandings
and identities are formed and sustained." Id. at 1535-36.
81. Habermas can be viewed as attempting to resurrect the legacy of modernism in
postmodernism. See HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS, supra note 49, at 3-4; HABERMAS,
PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE, supra note 49, at 294-326; Habermas, A Reply, supra note 49, at
240; see also BENHABIB, supra note 49, at 253-54 (arguing that Habermas aims to complete
modernism's legacy); WHITE, supra note 49, at 91 (discussing Habermas's project to develop
standards that provide a normative guide for, and critical analysis of, modernity).
82. Cass Sunstein, another new republican, also runs aground on the rocks of objectivism,
although in an entirely different manner. See Feldman, supra note 5, at 1343 (arguing that
Sunstein's concept of "naked preferences," which he opposes to the common good, is
socially constructed and not objective).
83. See supra notes 57-64 and accompanying text.
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argument fails on two related grounds: symbolic and material reproduction cannot be sharply distinguished, and all origins are contingent.
Habermas mistakenly presumes that we can separate symbolic reproduction in a lifeworld from material reproduction. The symbolic and the
material, however, are integrally entwined and cannot be fruitfully disentangled. Habermas's attempt to do so only enfeebles his vision of both.8 4
Thus, for example, Habermas too easily dismisses the forms in which
economic power and domination permeate and structure symbolic reproduction and cultural representations. As John Brenkman writes: "[H]ermeneutical experience is always already caught up within social systems of
labor and social relations of domination., 8 5 Gadamer underscores this
weakness in Habermas's position when he states that the three components of the hermeneutic act-understanding, interpretation, and applica87
86
tion-are all part of "one unified process" and are not distinct events.
We are given and understand a tradition (and hence an origin or starting
point) only insofar as we participate in that tradition; we participate in a
tradition only insofar as we interpret it; and we interpret it only insofar as
we apply it to practical problems within our current horizon. We cannot
extract any one component of this hermeneutic process. The hermeneutic
act always includes the practical or material component of application as
well as the more symbolic components of understanding and interpretation.8 8 By suggesting otherwise, Habermas inches dangerously close to
idealism.8 9
Thus, the lifeworld of symbolic reproduction cannot provide Habermas
with a noncontingent origin for his neo-transcendental argument. Indeed,
all origins or starting points are contingent: there is no thing-in-itself, only
contested descriptions.90 To be sure, postmodern theories such as philo-

84. See BRENKMAN, supra note 12, at 47-48; FRASER, supra note 12, at 118-22.
85. BRENKMAN, supra note 12, at 55 (emphasis added).
86. GADAMER, supra note 33, at 308.

87. See id. at 307-08, 340-41 (arguing that the three components are integrally related and
that each is necessary to the hermeneutic act); Feldman, New Metaphysics, supra note 15, at

683-84 (explaining Gadamer's theory).
88. Brenkman argues that Gadamer too is guilty of a form of idealism because he believes
that tradition and validated meanings stand above domination. That is, Gadamer obscures
the relations between a society and a text. BRENKMAN, supra note 12, at 27-28, 31-33, 41.

Weinsheimer, on the other hand, emphasizes that Gadamer sees understanding as practical (because of the concept of "application") and ties Gadamer to Wittgensteinian pragmatism. WEINSHEIMER, supra note 33, at 187 & n.50.
89. Habermas denies that he is guilty of idealism. HABERMAS, PHILOSOPHICAL DIsCOURSE, supra note 49, at 321-26. Nonetheless, the force of his argument for critical

standards arises from his claim of universality, which is grounded on a "transcendent
moment." Id. at 322. Habermas thus seems to suggest that communication can potentially
transcend materiality, which sounds suspiciously idealistic.
90. See STANLEY FISH, Critical Self-Consciousness, Or Can We Know What We're Doing?, in
DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY 436, 450-55 (1989).
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sophical hermeneutics do not deny the existence of an origin or starting
point for dialogue or interpretation. But communal tradition gives us that
origin-we are thrown into tradition and, hence, into an initial conception
of communication. That initial conception therefore is not a preexisting
object that we directly access. Instead, it is understood only as we interpret it (and tradition) from within our current horizon. Once again,
Gadamer captures this important point when he states that understanding,
interpretation, and application are all part of one unified hermeneutic
process. 9 ' Because we cannot extract any one component of this hermeneutic process, such as an understanding of tradition, we cannot treat it as
an uncontested or noncontingent origin. When we make this error, we
tacitly presume exactly what we are trying to prove: that the now supposedly uncontested origin is constituted in a particular manner.9 2
Habermas's erroneous attempt to separate symbolic from material reproduction has serious consequences. Because he presumes the existence of a
purified lifeworld of the symbolic, Habermas insists that his neo-transcendental analysis culminates by revealing the ideal speech situation as a
universal critical standard. Many commentators, however, have suggested
Jacques Derrida writes:

[T]he signified concept is never present in and of itself, in a sufficient presence that
would refer only to itself. Essentially and lawfully, every concept is inscribed in a

chain or in a system within which it refers to the other, to other concepts, by means
of the systematic play of differences.
JACQUES DERRIDA, MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY 11 (Alan Bass trans., 1982).

Richard Rorty comments:
[A] fundamental choice ... confronts the reflective mind: that between accepting
the contingent character of starting-points, and attempting to evade this contingency. To accept the contingency of starting-points is to accept our inheritance
from, and our conversation with, our fellow-humans as our only source of guidance.
To attempt to evade this contingency is to hope to become a properly-programmed

machine.
RICHARD RORTY, Pragmatism, Relativism, and Irrationalism, in CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM 160, 166 (1982) [hereinafter RORTY, Pragmatism]. Rorty adds that an "old pragmatist

chestnut" is that "one is really comparing two descriptions of a thing rather than a
description with the thing-in-itself." RICHARD RORTY, Nineteenth-Century Idealism and
Twentieth-Century Textualism, in CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM 139, 154 (1982) [hereinafter CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM]; cf. James Tully, Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy:
Understanding Practices of Critical Reflection, 17 POL. THEORY 172, 187-88 (1989) (arguing
that despite Habermas's reconstructive argument, we cannot escape the practice of valida-

tion in order to ground validation).
91. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.

92. Cf. BENHABIB, supra note 49, at 21-22, 25 (explaining Hegel's objection to counterfactual reasoning). For example, Habermas writes that "the communicative model of action
presupposes language as a medium of uncurtailed communication whereby speakers and
hearers, out of the context of their preinterpretedlifeworld, refer simultaneously to things in the
objective, social, and subjective worlds." 1 HABERMAS, THE THEORY, supra note 49, at 95
(emphasis added).
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that Habermas's ideal speech situation does not manifest a universal
standard; instead, it reflects Habermas's own horizon within the traditions
of Western philosophy and social theory.93 As Josef Bleicher rhetorically
suggests: "Is [Habermas's] critique of ideology not itself ideological?, 94 In
sum, from the perspective of postmodern theories, one cannot identify any
noncontingent origins that are needed to anchor a neo-transcendental
argument, and, thus, one cannot discover any necessary or presupposed
critical norms within communicative action. To the contrary, critical norms
can develop only through the communicative or interpretive process itself.
Turning to Michelman, his neo-transcendental reconstruction of American constitutionalism suffers from the same weakness that plagues Habermas's argument. Michelman initiates his argument by assuming the
existence of an ideal American constitutionalism, which provides a stable
and, in effect, noncontingent origin for his analysis. To Michelman, "we"
surely agree that American constitutionalism rests on two commitmentsself-government and government by law-which create a problematic tension at the core of the American governmental system. Michelman then
proceeds to describe his normative standard, presupposed by his conception of American constitutionalism. But just as Habermas facilitated his
neo-transcendental argument by mistakenly assuming that we can sharply
separate symbolic from material reproduction, Michelman simplifies his
argument by erroneously assuming that American constitutionalism is
actually defined by his ideal. American constitutionalism, however, is not
an ideal, but rather it emerges as a complex and shifting amalgam of
symbolic and material processes, including various forms of symbolic and
material domination. Thus, American constitutionalism does not stand as
a stable and preexisting thing-in-itself that we can analyze or reconstruct
to delineate any presupposed critical norms. 95 Insofar as American constitutionalism and self-government are dialogic or interpretive practices (which
93. See BENHABIB, supra note 49, at 291, 303-06, 325 (presumptions that define the ideal
speech situation necessarily are affected by the cultural and historical context); Mary Hesse,
Science and Objectivity, in HABERMAS: CRITICAL DEBATES, supra note 49, at 98, 112-13;
JAMESON, supra note 14, at 58-59 (suggesting that Habermas's arguments might be correct if
limited to the local situation of politics in Germany); Steven Lukes, Of Gods and Demons:
Habermas and Practical Reason, in HABERMAS: CRITICAL DEBATES, supra note 49, at 134,
135-37; McCarthy, supra note 49, at 64-65; Thompson, supra note 49, at 128; cf. RORTY,
Pragmatism, supra note 90, at 173 (stating that Habermas attempts to go transcendental
when he should remain ethnocentric); WHITE, supra note 49, at 30-31. Fraser explains that
"whereas Habermas purports to ground 'communicative ethics' in the conditions of possibility of speech understood universalistically and ahistorically, I consider it a contingently
evolved, historically specific possibility." FRASER, supra note 12, at 187 n.41.
94. BLEICHER, supra note 34, at 159.
95. See generally Pierre Schlag, Cannibal Moves: An Essay on the Metamorphoses of the
Legal Distinction, 40 STAN. L. REV. 929 (1988) (offering a postmodern attack on the stability
of legal distinctions in general).
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is the point of Michelman's conception of strong dialogic politics), then
any critical standard with a regulative effect on self-government exists only
norm within the practice of American constitutionalism
as a 9contested
6
itself.
Despite Michelman's claims, his stipulation (ii)-requiring nondistortion and communal inclusiveness 9 7 -does not emerge as a precondition of
American constitutionalism and self-government. Stipulation (ii) more
likely reflects Michelman's interpretive horizon, arising from his position
as a renowned, white, male, left-leaning professor at Harvard Law School.9 8
Thus, many other American citizens would insist that we should not allow
everybody to participate in self-government. For example, most would
concede that young children and sociopaths should be excluded from
self-government and that their exclusion does not undermine or reduce the
possibility of American constitutionalism.9 9 Of course, many would disagree about who should and should not be excluded.1 00 The norm of
nondistortion and communal inclusiveness therefore stands not as a precondition of American constitutionalism, but rather it emerges as a contested
component of self-government itself (or more precisely, the degree of
nondistortion and inclusiveness develops as a contested component of
self-government). And most important, we contest or deliberate about the
degree of nondistortion and inclusiveness within the dialogic or interpretive practice of self-government. In other words, self-government can be
seen (perhaps paradoxically) as the social and political struggle over the
meaning or definition of self-government and American constitutionalism.
Michelman's and Habermas's arguments share a second crucial difficulty.
Even if Habermas correctly separates symbolic and material reproduction,
many postmodern theorists suggest that Habermas's ideal speech situation
and, thus, Michelman's stipulation (ii)-both demanding nondistortion
and communal inclusiveness-are not only factually unlikely but inherently
impossible. Postmodernists emphasize that power, with simultaneously
enabling and distorting effects, remains ever-present.1 " 1 Most significant,

96. Rorty explains that there is "no criterion that we have not created in the course of
creating a practice." RICHARD RORTY, Introduction: Pragmatism and Philosophy, in CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM, supra note 90, at xiii, xlii; cf Tully, supra note 90, at 182 (claiming

that critical reflection is itself a practice presupposing customary ways of acting).
97. See supra text accompanying note 72.
98. Cf. Steven L. Winter, Indeterminacy and Incommensurability in Constitutional Law, 78

CAL. L. REV. 1441, 1481-83 (1990) (arguing that Michelman is a product of his own situation
and thus tends to overemphasize the power or freedom of the subject).
99. I suspect that Michelman too would agree to this qualification to stipulation (ii).
100. Cf. BENHABIB, supra note 49, at 306-07 (arguing that Habermas's focus on discourse
is itself a controversial normative position because it excludes those who cannot speak, such

as children, "fools," and animals from the domain of ethical theory).
101. See, e.g., FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 12, at 92-97 (arguing
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even language itself manifests power. As Michel Foucault states: "[Iln
human relations, whatever they are-whether it be a question of communicating verbally ... or a question of a love relationship, an institutional or
Thus, exclusion,
economic relationship-power is always present ....
coercion, domination, and other distortive effects of power are inherent to
communication and dialogue. 11 3 Linda Nicholson writes that "conceptual
distinctions, criteria of legitimation, cognitive procedural rules, and so
forth are all political and therefore represent moves of power [though]
is exhibited in, for example,
they represent a different type of power10 than
4
physical violence or the threat of force."'

that power is omnipresent because it is produced from one moment to the next in every
relationship); FRASER, supra note 12, at 18 (arguing that power is both destructive and
beneficial and embedded in all social practices); WARTENBERG, supra note 12, at 12 (stating
that power is both a positive and negative feature of society). See generally Robert C. Post,
The ConstitutionalConcept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation,

and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601, 643 (1990) (focusing on a "paradox
of public discourse": the need to challenge community in order to have transformative
political dialogue).
102. Raul Fornet-Betancourt et al., The Ethic of Care For the Self as a Practice of
Freedom: An Interview with Michael Foucault (J.D. Gauthier trans.), in THE FINAL FouCAULT 1, 11 (James Bernauer & David Rasmussen eds., 1988); see FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE
AND PUNISH, supra note 12, at 27-28; Michel Foucault, Truth and Power, in THE FOUCAULT
READER 51, 60-61 (Paul Rabinow ed., 1984). Nancy Fraser writes: "power is everywhere
and in everyone." FRASER, supra note 12, at 26.
According to Stephen K. White: "[Foucault's] genealogies, like Nietzsche's, discover
power operating in structures of thinking and behavior which previously seemed to be devoid
of power relations .... [Foucault] wants to show us that [cognitive and institutional structures of modern life] which we take to be thoroughly enabling are always simultaneously
constraining." WHITE, supra note 49, at 144. Similarly, Richard Bernstein writes: "[Foucault] is always showing us how discursive practices exclude, marginalize, and limit us."
RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, Foucault: Critique as a Philosophic Ethos, in THE NEW CONSTELLATION, supra note 33, at 142, 160. Bernstein adds that, to Derrida, "we never quite eliminate
violence from our language, institutions, and practices." RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, An Allegory

of Modernity IPostmodemity: Habermas and Derrida, in THE NEW

CONSTELLATION,

supra note

33, at 199, 217.
103. See generally JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (Gayatri C. Spivak trans.,
1976) (attempting the deconstruction of the hierarchies or privileged positions within
oppositions); Fornet-Betancourt et al., supra note 102, at 18 (describing Foucault criticizing
Habermas's ideal speech situation as utopian).
104. Nicholson, supra note 45, at 11. Thomas Wartenberg explains:
[Because power, in the form of influence,] takes place at the most basic level of the
constitution of a human being's understanding of the world, it need not be limited
to the restructuring of options already given to an agent. Such domination works by
first making social agents aware of the options that they face as having a certain
character. It is a use of power, since it affects an agent's understanding of his
action-environment; but is not interventional, because it does not so much restructure an agent's action-environment as constitute his awareness of it in the first
place.
WARTENBERG, supra note 12, at 135.
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Gadamer's writings support this critique of the ideal speech situation
and stipulation (ii). Gadamer explains that our prejudices and interests,
derived from communal traditions, both enable and constrain understanding and interpretation. Prejudices and interests open us to the possibility
of understanding: without prejudices and interests, understanding and
communication are impossible. But simultaneously, our prejudices and
interests necessarily constrain and direct our understanding and communication. One's life within a community and its cultural traditions always
limits or "distorts" one's range of vision-what one can possibly perceive
or understand.10 5 Furthermore, Gadamer adds that we are historical
beings who live in tradition, just as we live in a community: tradition is not
a thing of the past, rather it is something we constantly participate in.106
Thus, we constantly constitute and reconstitute our tradition, our culture,
and our community as we engage in dialogical understanding.0 7 Most
important, this constant reconstitution always is simultaneously constructive and destructive. 0 8 It is constructive in the sense that we constantly
build new traditions and communities, constantly adding to our already
existing traditions and communities through interpretation and understanding, thus including new concepts, interests, prejudices, and, significantly,
participants. Yet the reconstitution is also destructive-distortive and
exclusive-insofar as we weaken or eliminate previously existing traditions
and communities and exclude concepts, interests, prejudices, and participants.'°9
105. See Fish, supra note 90, at 450-57; supra text accompanying notes 33-37. Gadamer writes:
This formulation certainly does not mean that we are enclosed within a wall of

prejudices and only let through the narrow portals those things that can produce a
pass saying, "Nothing new will be said here." Instead we welcome just that guest
who promises something new to our curiosity. But how do we know the guest whom
we admit is one who has something new to say to us? Is not our expectation and our
readiness to hear the new also necessarily determined by the old that has already

taken possession of us?
Gadamer, supra note 34, at 133.

106. Gadamer writes: "Tradition is not simply a permanent precondition; rather, we
produce it ourselves inasmuch as we understand, participate in the evolution of tradition,
and hence further determine it ourselves."

GADAMER,

supra note 33, at 293. Steven L.

Winter writes about how we are thrown into our community and its traditions: "Every actual
self begins as part of a community that it does not choose and cannot escape .... Steven L. Winter,
Contingency and Community in NormativePractice,139 U. PA. L. REV. 963,987 (1991).
107. See James B. White, Judicial Criticism, 20 GA. L. REV. 835, 867 (1986) (community
and culture are made and remade in a conversation over time). See generally JAMES B.
WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING

(1984).

108. See Richard Delgado, Storytellingfor Oppositionists and Others: A Plea ForNarrative,

87 MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2414-15 (1989) (asserting that storytelling both builds and destroys
community).
109. See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 17 (1988) (claiming that whenever a
community rests upon an authoritative text, different modes of interpretation are likely to
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In short, dialogue and understanding are distortive and destructive in
two ways: our prejudices and interests (manifestations of power) constrain
the possibilities for dialogue, and the reconstitution of tradition (also a
manifestation of power) necessarily destroys and excludes certain prejudices, interests, and participants. 1 0 Consequently, if Michelman's stipulation (ii)-requiring nondistortion and inclusion-truly stands as a
precondition for American constitutionalism, then American constitutionalism becomes nonsense. Coercion, domination, exclusion, and other distortive effects of power are always part of dialogue and understanding;
hence, if dialogic politics is central to American constitutionalism and
self-government, then some degree of distortion and exclusion must always
remain part of American constitutionalism."' This somber yet vital realizasplinter that community). In law, Robert Cover most clearly focuses on the destructiveness
or violence of the interpretive process. See generally Robert M. Cover, Violence and the
Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986).
Brenkman argues that Gadamer does not sufficiently recognize the distortive power of
tradition, but rather accepts tradition as authoritative. BRENKMAN, supra note 12, at 30-38;
cf. WARNKE, supra note 33, at 91-99 (questioning whether Gadamer conservatively accepts
tradition).
110. Jean-Francois Lyotard raises a similar criticism of Habermas, arguing that Habermas
assumes that "it is possible for all speakers to come to agreement on which rules or
metaprescriptions are universally valid for language games, when it is clear that language
games are heteromorphous, subject to heterogeneous sets of pragmatic rules." LYOTARD,
supra note 1, at 65; cf. WHITE, supra note 49, at 133-34 (arguing that structures of consciousness might be more constraining on human thought than Habermas admits).
The distortive and destructive aspects of understanding and dialogue suggest that we
should refrain from exaggerating the power of abstract reason to direct the course of
political deliberations. See Feldman, supra note 5 (other human motivations, such as racism,
distort rationality). See generally Fish, Dennis Martinez, supra note 34 (questioning the power
of theory to control practices). When Michelman emphasizes nondistortion and inclusiveness as central to American constitutionalism, his primary concern is to clear the political
channels for the dialogical flow of pure reason. For Michelman, a totally inclusive and
undistorted political dialogue is necessary so that all participants can reach a conclusion
based solely on the rational force of the best argument. Although some form of rationality
must be a part of a civic republican political vision, we must acknowledge that many forces
other than reason motivate people to reach an understanding and to act. These forces can
be as noble as altruism or as sordid as racism. Michelman's stilted vision of a political
dialogue completely free of the distortive forces of tradition erroneously leads him to inflate
the role of reason in politics. See Winter, supra note 98, at 1478-80 (arguing that Michelman's approach is too rationalistic to be politically transformative); cf. BENHABIB, supra note
49, at 316-17, 320-22 (discussing rationalist fallacy); Feldman, supra note 5, at 1846-49,
1851-54 (noting how racism threatens to undermine pluralistic and civic republican political
theories); Thompson, supra note 49, at 128 (criticizing Habermas for failing to recognize that
a genuine agreement can arise from motivations other than reason, such as compassion or
commitment to a common goal); Robin West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of
Consent in the Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 384, 387 (1985) (arguing that individuals often consent to interactions not because
their choice rationally promotes their well-being, but because of diverse motivations, including a desire to submit to authority).
111. Cf. Winter, supra note 98, at 1476-78, 1480-81 (arguing that Michelman's concept of
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tion suggests that self-government must be the constant dialogue over the
construction and reconstruction of tradition and community and, therefore, over who will be included and excluded from the community. American constitutionalism, at its core, requires constant dialogue about the
degree of nondistortion and inclusiveness within the political community.
B. PREREFLECTIVE COGNITIVE STRUCTURES

In a recent article coauthored with Margaret Jane Radin, Michelman
appears to recognize that the persistence of power-of distortion and
communal exclusion-presents a crucial problem for his conception of
dialogic politics.' 12 Michelman writes:
From the poststructuralist vantage ...dialogism's dilemma is that dialogue (insofar as it is not disguised coercion) presupposes community;
but community is not, finally, a matter of will or sympathetic exertion but
rather is a contingency of cognitive structures into which we are thrown.
... The dialogic idea entails "prescription that specifies in advance the
conditions under which dialogue will count as persuasion rather than
coercion." If this prescription is itself coercion-but what else could it
be?-then how
can dialogue be undominated, a medium of self1 13
emancipation?
Or, as Michelman eventually phrases the question more succinctly: "Where
can we possibly hope to find the unprescribed yet predialogic 'community'
required for undominated dialogue?" 1'14
In a rather opaque passage, Michelman suggests that Steven L. Winter's
experientialist theory of cognition and meaning in the law might respond
to this question.1 15 According to Michelman, "Winter has found a possible
dialogue is too polite and intellectualized, and that he does not recognize the significant
inertia of our situated context, which strongly resists transformation).
112. Margaret J. Radin & Frank Michelman, Pragmatistand Poststructuralist CriticalLegal
Practice, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1019, 1040-43 (1991). I shall, for the most part, refer in the text
to Michelman as if he were the sole author of this article. I do so not to detract from
Radin's contributions. Instead, as discussed in the text, I believe this article could be read as
possibly responding to the issues that I raise concerning Michelman's other articles. Consequently, to simplify my argument, I shall merely refer to Michelman when discussing this
article.
113. Id. at 1041 (quoting Winter, supra note 106, at 970) (footnotes omitted).
114. Radin & Michelman, supra note 112, at 1042. Before restating the problem in this
manner, Michelman and Radin offer pragmatism as a possible solution, but they quickly
admit that pragmatism alone cannot resolve the difficulty. See id. at 1041-42.
115. Id. at 1042-43. See generally Steven L. Winter, An Upside/Down View of the CountermajoritarianDifficulty, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1881 (1991) [hereinafter Winter, Upside/Down]; Steven
L. Winter, Bull Durham and the Uses of Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 639 (1990); Winter, supra
note 106; Steven L. Winter, Foreword: On Building Houses, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1595 (1991);
Winter, supra note 98; Steven Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and
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common ground of this prerequisite intersubjectivity in a human commonality of prereflective cognitive structures."'1 16 These prereflective cognitive
structures-such as up and down, front and back, and near and far-arise
from one's physical and social experiences as an embodied self in the
world. 1 7 Michelman acknowledges, however, that if communication were
to depend solely on the prereflective cognitive structures, then communicative possibilities would be severely limited."' Again, however, Michelman
suggests that Winter might provide an answer: this time with his concept

the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105 (1989) [hereinafter Winter, Transcendental Nonsense].

116. Radin & Michelman, supra note 112, at 1042 (emphasis added). Winter might prefer
that Michelman and Radin remain more faithful to his original language and therefore refer
to "basic concepts," Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, supra note 115, at 1147, or "basic
image patterns or schemata," Winter, supra note 106, at 994, instead of referring to
prereflective cognitive structures.
117. GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 56-57 (1980). Winter

writes "that human knowledge is grounded in our direct physical and social experience with
the world, but is elaborated indirectly, largely by means of metaphor and the extension of
idealized cognitive models." Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, supra note 115, at 1115.
Winter elaborates:
[R]eason, language, and knowledge can be understood only in terms of the cognitive process. That process is embodied; it arises directly from physical experience.
The process ... is dependent on the kinds of bodies that we have and the ways in
which those bodies interact with our environment. It is grounded in a reality that to
a very large degree is shared by all human beings.
Id. at 1130-31 (footnotes omitted).
Winter relies heavily on three books by George Lakoff, a professor of linguistics, and Mark
Johnson, a professor of philosophy. For a sample of their writings, see generally MARK
JOHNSON, THE BODY IN THE MIND (1987); GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS (1987); LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra. Following Lakoff and Johnson's identifica-

tion of several "concepts that we live by in the most fundamental way," such as up and down,
front and back, in and out, and near and far, LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra, at 56-57, Winter
explains:
[W]e structure abstract concepts indirectly by means of more directly experienced
"concepts" such as up and down. Those basic concepts are meaningful because
they are embodied-that is, because they arise from and are grounded in our
preconceptual bodily experiences. Intermediate concepts such as up-down are
imaginative schemata that we derive from our daily interactions in the world. They
are not determined by or immanent in the world. Rather, they are how we as
humans make sense of it; how we make worlds.
Winter, TranscendentalNonsense, supra note 115, at 1146-47; see id. at 1158.

118. Michelman writes: "[It would seem that 'dialogue' under these conditions could
hardly do other than statically exchange the products of these naturalistically rooted,
culturally codified cognitive structures." Radin & Michelman, supra note 112, at 1042.
Winter has supported this interpretation of his work: "I have frequently argued that our
linguistic and conceptual capacities are grounded in our physical embodiment. But if that is
all we share, communication will be very difficult and rudimentary." Winter, supra note 106,
at 1002 (footnote omitted).
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of "slippage."19 For Winter, slippage refers to the way that culture or
tradition changes over time. Culture or tradition is not mechanically
passed intact from one generation to the next, rather it is imaginatively
reproduced at each moment.1 20 Slippage, according to Michelman, thus
introduces the plurality of121
prejudices and interests that renders complex
political dialogue possible.
In fact, according to Michelman's reading of Winter, the current problem is not a lack of plurality, but an unmanageable plethora of prejudices
and interests that creates vast chasms that frustrate our efforts at normative dialogue: "The epistemic distances have grown too great, the ethers
too rarified, to allow for any but the merest slivers of persuasive communi12 2
cation across the gaping subcultural fissures in our fractured society.'
But yet again, Michelman finds a possible answer in Winter: "Still (we
[Michelman and Radin] read Winter as saying), the receding but never
completely vanished physical substrates of cognitive likeness always offer-to those who will trouble to understand them-the hope of slowly,
laboriously, inching towards the cognitive community on which undominated dialogue depends. Winter joins Habermas. 1 23 At this final stage of
Michelman's argument, his interpretation of Winter can be read in three
different ways, which I shall refer to as the strong, weak, and weakest
readings of Michelman. Unfortunately, all three readings encounter serious problems.1 24
119. Radin & Michelman, supra note 112, at 1042.
120. Winter writes:
[T]he processes of cultural learning and reproduction are characterized by slippage.
If we conceptualize a community as a group of people who share common ways of
understanding and living in a physical and social world, then the existence of
slippage will mean that community is necessarily a relative phenomenon characterized by degrees of plurality and divergence.
Winter, supra note 106, at 996 (footnote omitted).
121. According to Michelman and Radin, "This 'slippage' then represents the possibility
of dialogue (not just recycling monologue), given physique-based cognitive commonality."
Radin & Michelman, supra note 112, at 1042.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1042-43.
124. 1 assume, arguendo, that Michelman correctly reads Winter, that Winter correctly
reads the cognitive theorists whom he relies on, and that the experientialist theory of
cognition and meaning is correct. Of course, Michelman's argument could be questioned on
any of these points, and I do raise some of these criticisms briefly in the footnotes. To
simplify matters in the text, however, I will effectively give Michelman every possible benefit
of the doubt in bypassing these potential points of criticism. Instead, I focus in the text on
the problems created when Michelman attempts to adopt, in a presumably correct fashion,
Winter's presumably correct theory.
Whether Michelman correctly reads Winter is unclear. See infra note 126. Moreover,
whether Winter thinks Michelman misreads him is also unclear. In an article entitled,
Without Privilege, Winter discusses Michelman and Radin's article. Steven L. Winter,
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According to the strong reading of Michelman, as he interprets Winter,
we must struggle to strip away the many sedimented layers of conflicting
communal traditions that sharply differentiate us and frustrate our efforts
at normative dialogue.' 25 If we successfully strip away the layers of communal traditions, we will reveal the basic and raw prereflective cognitive
structures. Those prereflective cognitive structures are, in effect, equivalent to prejudices and interests that can ground undistorted and inclusive
dialogue. Because all people inherently possess the prereflective cognitive
structures, all dialogical participants have at least the minimal prejudices
and interests that are needed to make communication possible. Simultaneously, all participants share the same prereflective cognitive structures
and thus have the same prejudices and interests. Consequently, no dialogic participant is coerced or otherwise illegitimately influenced into
accepting any prejudices and interests other than her own.' 2 6
Without Privilege, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1063 (1991). At one point, Winter insists that
Michelman and Radin misread him, but not with regard to the issues on which I focus. Id. at
1063. At another point, Winter does cite the pages that cause concern for me in the
Michelman and Radin article. Id. at 1070 n.39. More precisely, in the last paragraph of his
article, Winter writes: "[Agency] lies in that very capacity for imagination and redescription,
a capacity that is contingent rather than originary. But, then, that makes it all very
complicated." Id. at 1070 (ellipses in original) (footnotes omitted). After the final sentence,
Winter cites himself with a "see" cite and then cites Michelman and Radin with an
unexplained "see also" cite. Id. at 1070 n.39. What Winter means by this citation remains
very unclear.
Finally, the experientialist theory of cognition and meaning is quite controversial. For
example, critics argue that Lakoff and Johnson, the leading proponents of this theory, see
supra note 117, demonstrate a lack of knowledge of the relevant background theories and
lack empirical evidence to support their approach. See Ronald R. Butters, Book Review, 81
S. ATLANTIC Q. 128, 129 (1982) (reviewing GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS
WE LIVE By (1980)) (asserting that the authors lack knowledge of contemporary theory of
metaphor); Dominic W. Massaro, Book Review, 102 AM. J. PSYCHOL. 271, 275 (1989)
(reviewing GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS (1987)) (arguing that
it is unclear how to scientifically test Lakoff's theory); Barbara M. H. Strang, Book Review,
77 MOD. LANGUAGE REV. 134 (1982) (reviewing GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON,
METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980)). For additional criticisms of the experientialist theory as
well as Winter's use of it, see Brian Leiter, Intellectual Voyeurism in Legal Scholarship, 4
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 79, 95-96 n.58 (1992); Dennis M. Patterson, Law's Pragmatism: Law as
Practiceand Narrative, 76 VA. L. REV. 937, 966-68 n.114 (1990); see also Cornell, supra note
33, at 343 (arguing that we should not treat human finitude as a thing-in-itself).
125. For a discussion of the concept of sedimentation, see Winter, Upside/Down, supra
note 115, at 1883; Winter, supra note 98, at 1487-91.
126. Whether Michelman correctly reads Winter on this important point is unclear.
There is language from Winter that suggests that Michelman is correct. For example,
Winter directly discusses Michelman's stipulation (ii) in an apparently approving manner:
On the first reading, statement (ii) is an explicit acknowledgement that republican
persuasion is dependent on the existence of prescriptive preconditions.
But a
closer reading of the passage indicates that persuasion entails "community" in the
very sense that I have employed it. For it is only within a community of shared
understandings that one could experience as noncoercive, noninvasive, and respect-
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Assuming that we could strip away the layers of communal traditions,
which is highly unlikely,127 this strong reading of Michelman nonetheless
raises three serious problems that go to the heart of his theory. First, even
if prereflective cognitive structures exist, they do not appear to eradicate
the persistence of power with its distortive effects. The prereflective
cognitive structures simply do not differ in any meaningful sense from the
prejudices and interests that we derive from communal traditions. At both
the individual and communal levels, most prejudices, interests, and traditions are no less prereflective than the so-called prereflective cognitive
structures: ordinarily we are unaware of how communal traditions shape
our perceptions and understandings. Even more important, insofar as the
prereflective cognitive structures operate as prejudices and interests that
open us to understanding and communication, then the structures must
forcefully limit and direct our understanding and communication. If the
structures are sufficient to enable dialogue, then they must be constraining."8 These constraints or limitations manifest power, even though no
person or group intentionally imposes them.12 9 Indeed, the limiting or
distortive power of a tradition does not arise because some individual or
ful of one's freedom, a process in which one is the object of dialogic modulation by
others. It is only when all the participants have internalized the same set of
prescriptions as constituting a dialogue (and not, say, a diatribe or harangue) that
undergoing dialogic modulation by others would be experienced as persuasion and
not prescription.
Winter, supra note 106, at 971 (emphasis and footnotes omitted). In particular, the last
sentence of this passage suggests that Michelman correctly seeks some uniform "set of
prescriptions" in Winter's prereflective cognitive structures. Thus, Winter writes that "[firagmentation and democracy cannot coexist precisely because the common matrix is increasingly undone." Id. at 1002. Consequently, Winter concludes: "Ultimately, we must come to
see it is our similar embodiment and shared social situatedness that jointly provide the
common grounds upon which the work of empathy can-and must-be done." Id.; see also
id. at 997 (equating social cohesiveness with degree of similarity). Nonetheless, contrary to
Michelman's reading of Winter, Winter also clearly states at several points that cultural
diversity is inevitable in actual communities; the sedimented layers of traditions cannot be
peeled away to reveal the raw prereflective cognitive structures. See id. at 987, 991-92.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 93-100. Even Lakoff and Johnson, the leading
proponents of the experientialist theory of cognition and meaning, suggest that we never can
totally strip away culture or tradition:
Cultural assumptions, values, and attitudes are not a conceptual overlay which we
may or may not place upon experience as we choose. It would be more correct to
say that all experience is cultural through and through, that we experience our
Iworld' in such a way that our culture is already present in the very experience itself.
LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 117, at 57.

128. See supra text accompanying notes 105-111.
129. This point can be reinforced if we analogize the prereflective cognitive structures to
some physical attribute, such as how humans have lungs, not gills. Our lungs enable us to
breathe air, but our lungs (and lack of gills) forcefully limit (in a potentially violent manner)
our ability to function in water.
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group purposefully created the tradition. To the contrary, communal
traditions forcefully distort or limit us because of their dead weightover them. 3 °
because, to a large degree, nobody has any direct control
13 1
structures.
The same holds true for prereflective cognitive
Second, Michelman's method for eliminating the normative gaps caused
by divergent prejudices and interests within our community resounds with
the dangerous conservatism that many fear in civic republicanism and that
Michelman otherwise vigorously seeks to overcome. Michelman argues
that the key to attaining undistorted and inclusive dialogue is to "trouble
to understand" the prereflective cognitive structures so that we can "inch"
towards our ideal community. 132 Under the strong reading of Michelman,
he urges us here to discard our conflicting traditions, prejudices, and
interests so that we may uncover our commonality in the prereflective
cognitive structures. In the end, and despite his protestations to the
contrary, 133 Michelman appears (according to the strong reading) to recom-

130. Karl Marx wrote: "The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare
on the brain of the living." Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, in THE
MARX-ENGELS READER 594, 595 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978); cf. FOUCAULT, THE
HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 12, at 95 (opining that often nobody is controlling
power). Iris Young writes:
[Oppression] refers to systemic and structural phenomena that are not necessarily
the result of the intentions of a tyrant. Oppression. in the structural sense is part of
the basic fabric of a society, not a function of a few people's choices or policies.
You won't eliminate this structural oppression by getting rid of the rulers or making
some new laws, because oppressions are systematically reproduced in major economic, political, and cultural institutions.
Iris M. Young, Five Faces of Oppression, in RETHINKING POWER 174, 176 (Thomas E.

Wartenberg ed., 1992).
131. Cf. Thompson, supra note 49, at 129 (noting that Habermas assumes that the
symmetrical distribution of chances to select and use speech acts is equivalent to a lack of
internal constraints, but symmetry seems to assure only formal equality, not lack of constraint).
In discussing transitions in the forms of criminal punishment, Foucault notes:
[There is] a shift in the point of application of ... power: it is no longer the body,
with the ritual play of excessive pains, spectacular brandings in the ritual of the
public execution; it is the mind or rather a play of representations and signs
circulating discreetly but necessarily and evidently in the minds of all.
FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 12, at 101.
When I state that traditions (and the prereflective cognitive structures, if they exist)
forcefully limit our understanding and perception, I do not mean to suggest that they
prevent us from doing what we "really desire." In a sense, they do not interfere with our
"free will," but rather they shape and limit what we might will, want, or desire. Cf. Balkin,
supra note 34, at 1142 (asserting that ideology always constrains because it is like a mold, not
like a chain).
132. Radin & Michelman, supra note 112, at 1043.

133. See Michelman, Republic, supra note 5, at 1527 ("a final dissolution of difference is
not required" to satisfy stipulation (ii)); cf. WHITE, supra note 49, at 81-83 (arguing that
Habermas's theory is not imperialistic, smothering the "other").
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mend stripping away the layers of culture and tradition so as to flatten our
divisive prejudices and interests-to harmonize the divergent voices by
rendering them all the same. 134 The tendency of traditional civic republican doctrine to encourage conformity and consensus seems to have resurfaced in a most unlikely theorist.
Finally, if we could, as Michelman desires, strip away the layers of
cultural traditions and reduce our prejudices and interests to the most
basic prereflective cognitive structures, then we no longer would have the
political dialogue that Michelman embraces at the core of American
constitutionalism: instead, we would have only monologue.' 3 5 Our varied
traditions generate the conflicting prejudices and interests that propel the
communal dialogue. If we could nullify those conflicting prejudices and
interests, then we would have very little to deliberate about because we
would agree about everything.13 6 In effect, we all would be reduced to
being the same person-constituted by the minimal prejudices and inter137
ests entailed by the prereflective cognitive structures.
In this final criticism of the strong reading of Michelman's argument, we
can see that, once again, the civic republican potential for encouraging
undue conformity is surfacing in his conception of dialogic politics. Michelman proposes to strip away our differences, to return us to our most basic
prereflective cognitive structures, so that we can achieve undistorted and
inclusive dialogue. In effect, Michelman wishes that all participants to the
dialogue could agree at the outset to limit themselves to an identical set of
134. If we try to save Michelman's argument from these conservative implications, then
we inevitably seem to retreat to the weak and weakest readings of his argument, which have

their own serious drawbacks. See infra text accompanying notes 144-147.
135. Cf. BENHABIB, supra note 49, at 300 (discussing how Kantian ethics is monological

because "differences among concrete selves become quite irrelevant").
Michelman earlier appeared to recognize that if we depended on no more than the
prereflective cognitive structures, then we would be reduced to monologue. See supra text

accompanying notes 118-121. 'Thus, it is strange that Michelman would wind his way through
his argument, only to return to a conception of dialogue based solely or largely on prereflective cognitive structures without realizing that we would then probably only have monologue.
See supra text accompanying notes 119-123. Nonetheless, the most likely alternative read-

ings of Michelman's argument are the weak and weakest readings that I subsequently discuss
and that have their own serious drawbacks. See infra text accompanying notes 144-147.

136. See BENHABIB, supra note 49, at 311 (arguing that if a harmony of interests already
existed in the lifeworld, then there would be no need for discourse).
137. Cf. Lukes, supra note 93, at 139-41 (noting that to the extent the ideal speech

situation requires imagining people giving up all prejudices and interests other than rationality, they are no longer the same people). Lukes argues that if all prejudices and interests are
eliminated, then Habermas's ideal speech situation parallels Rawls's original position. Id. at
142-43; see JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 18-19 (1971) (stating that humans in the

original position are completely ignorant of their place in society). Sandel has criticized
Rawls's argument for so completely draining the quality of personality out of people in his
original position that one cannot imagine what a discussion of justice would be like in that
situation. See MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 128-29 (1982).
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prejudices and interests (the prereflective cognitive structures), thus assuring-from his perspective-an undistorted consensus at the conclusion of
the dialogue. That is, Michelman seeks a consensus before dialogue
begins in order to assure a consensus when dialogue ends. Michelman's
argument thus manifests a disproportionate commitment to consensus and
a failure to recognize the value of diversity within dialogue and, more
broadly, within the community.1 38 If we are concerned with promoting
political dialogue, then consensus should be viewed as but one moment in
dialogue, not as its end. 139 Disagreement and divergent views not only
generate but enrich dialogue, even increasing the effectiveness of group
decisionmaking. 14 ° To be sure, one major problem in American society is

138. Cf. BENHABIB, supra note 49, at 339-42 (criticizing Habermas for basing human
dignity on what we share in common, not on the distinctiveness of the other); RORTY, supra
note 31, at 316-18 (criticizing traditional epistemology for focusing on agreement); Iris M.
Young, The Ideal of Community and the Politics of Difference, in FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM,
supra note 45, at 300 (emphasizing a politics of difference).
Michelman quite clearly views consensus as the goal of political dialogue. He writes:
"Start again with the basal requirement for republican jurisgenerative politics: that both the
process and its law-like utterances must be such that everyone subject to those utterances
can regard himself or herself as actually agreeing that those utterances, issuing from that
process, warrant being promulgated as law." Michelman, Republic, supra note 5, at 1526.
Michelman, however, attempts to qualify this goal when he writes: "Perhaps ... a final
dissolution of difference is not required in order to meet the validity condition that everyone
subject to a law-like utterance can actually agree that the utterance warrants being promulgated as law." Id. at 1527.
139. According to Lyotard: "[C]onsensus is only a particular state of discussion, not its
end. Its end, on the contrary, is paralogy." LYOTARD, supra note 1, at 65-66; cf id. at 66
(claiming that Habermas mistakenly equates emancipation with regularization or the elimination of diversity). Richard Rorty writes: "The antipragmatist who insists that agreement is
[conversation's] goal ... mistakes an essential moment in the course of an activity for the
end of the activity." RORTY, Pragmatism,supra note 90, at 172.
140. See Feldman, supra note 5, at 1865-66, 1876; cf. ROMAND COLES, SELF/POWER/OTHER:
POLITICAL THEORY AND DIALOGICAL ETHICS 2-9 (1992) (emphasizing the significance of
edges or differences to ethics); WEINSHEIMER, supra note 33, at 254 ("Difference is the
condition of interpretation."). According to one psychologist:
[M]ajorities foster convergence of attention, thought, and the number of alternatives considered. Minority viewpoints are important, not because they tend to
prevail but because they stimulate divergent attention and thought. As a result,
even when they are wrong they contribute to the detection of novel solutions and
decisions that, on balance, are qualitatively better. The implications of this are
considerable for creativity, problem solving, and decision making, both at the
individual and group levels.
Charlan J. Nemeth, Differential Contributions of Majority and Minority Influence, 93 PSYCHOL.

REV. 23, 23 (1986).
For example, Martin Luther King, Jr. wrote that the long oppression of African Americans
gives them "a special spiritual and moral" view of American society, and that unique
perspective helps to generate the creative tension that unmasks social injustices. Martin L.
King, Jr., A Testament of Hope, in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 313, 317 (James M. Washington ed., 1986) [hereinafter A
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"dialogue across differences,"' 14412 yet we must not forget that without
differences, there is no dialogue.'
At this point, it is useful to recall Michelman's initial goal: to revive
civic republicanism in order to focus American constitutional jurisprudence on the potential for a transformative political dialogue that would
include previously oppressed and disempowered people. A reader sympathetic to this goal (as I am) might object that Michelman could not intend
to mean what has been imputed to him under the strong reading of his
discussion, albeit opaque, of the prereflective cognitive structures. Any
reading of Michelman that concludes that he unwittingly supports conservatism and undue consensus while undermining dialogue is, according to this
objection, self-evidently incorrect. But if not the strong reading, then
what? If the strong reading is implausible because of the conclusions that
flow from it, then what does Michelman's discussion of the prereflective
cognitive structures mean? There are two more possibilities-the weak
and the weakest readings-which I now address.
According to the weak reading of Michelman's interpretation of Winter,
we can struggle to recognize our commonality rooted in the prereflective
cognitive structures, while we retain the many sedimented layers of communal traditions that sharply differentiate us. Once we recognize our commonality, Michelman argues, then we can have undistorted and inclusive
political dialogue. This weak reading of Michelman, however, reduces his
position to an overly romantic plea. Instead of beseeching us with the
commonplace appeal, "Just recognize that we are all people, and then we
will get along much better," Michelman in effect proclaims, "Just recognize that we are all embodied selves with shared prereflective cognitive
structures, and then we will get along much better."
If Michelman, by this reading, intends to suggest that diverse groups in
American society are unable to talk unless they first recognize their shared
prereflective cognitive structures, then his argument is obviously false.

TESTAMENT OF HOPE]; see
TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra,

Martin L. King, Jr., Letter From Birmingham City Jail, in A
at 289, 295.
King's view on the value of diversity in communal dialogue parallels the views of the
framers. Hamilton wrote that "differences of opinion, and the jarring of parties in [the
legislative] department ... often promote deliberation." THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 426-27
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
141. Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism and Clinical
Education, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1599, 1611 (1991). The problem of dialogue across differences
is central to the republican revival. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97
YALE L.J. 1713, 1718 (1988) ("Dialogue across the chasms separating differently situated
groups will surely be harder than republicans think."). I thank Tony Taibi for underscoring
this problem for me.
142. Cf. Nicholson, supra note 45, at 14 (arguing that one should not view difference as
superficially as a tourist does).
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Even the most opposed groups usually share some overlapping traditions,
prejudices, and interests (other than the prereflective cognitive structures),
which would enable them to communicate, if they so desired. The barriers
to productive communication often arise because of the traditions that the
different groups have beyond the overlapping ones: these additional traditions create the conflicting prejudices and interests that make dialogical
agreements appear difficult and sometimes impossible. Moreover, the
continued existence of these conflicting prejudices and interests dictates
that-regardless of any minimal level of commonality-some interests and
prejudices will be favored in dialogue while others will be minimized or
ignored. 14 3 Thus, the most conspicuous form of distortion and exclusion
necessarily will be present. In short, if Michelman intends merely to
recognize our commonality rooted in the prereflective cognitive structures
while retaining the sedimented layers of diverse communal traditions, then
he gives us nothing that we do not already have-some minimal level of
commonality-and fails to eliminate what often prevents fruitful dialogue
while producing obvious distortion and exclusion-our divergent traditions, prejudices, and interests.
Finally, according to the weakest reading of Michelman, he argues that
even if we are thrown into communal traditions that always are in part
distortive and exclusive, dialogue nonetheless remains the best means of
reducing the degree of distortion and exclusion. Through dialogue, in
other words, we can inch towards our ideal community, even though we
recognize at the outset that we never can achieve that ideal. If this
weakest.reading of Michelman is the correct one, then I agree with him:
dialogue is the best way to reduce the degree of distortion and exclusion
(though, most often, dialogue must be combined with other forces or
forms of power to be effective).14 4 Nevertheless, according to this reading,
Michelman defends only his argument for strong dialogic politics, but not
his normative standard, his neo-transcendental argument for stipulation
(ii).
Retracing my argument, Michelman's difficulty is that his neo-transcendental argument supposedly identifies stipulation (ii) as a normative standard for strong dialogic politics. Stipulation (ii) requires dialogue to be
totally inclusive and free of distortion. Insights from postmodern theories,
however, introduce serious problems for stipulation (ii): namely, dialogue
always is, in part, distortive and exclusive. According to the strong and

143. See supra text accompanying notes 105-111.
144. See Feldman, supra note 5, at 1864-66 (arguing that political discussion is a prerequisite for communal identification and solidarity); Feldman, supra note 4, at 718-21 (recognizing common good as interpretive; dialogue about interpretive common good allows recognition
of common interests); infra text accompanying notes 147-181.
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weak readings of Michelman, he therefore turns to the prereflective cognitive structures in an effort to respond to these postmodern problems. But
under either of these readings, the prereflective cognitive structures ultimately fail to create the possibility of undistorted and inclusive dialogue.
Finally, according to the weakest reading of Michelman, he does not turn
to the prereflective cognitive structures in order to save stipulation (ii)
from its postmodern problems, but rather he attempts only to save dialogic
politics.14 5 In other words, under the weakest reading, Michelman has not
yet offered any defense to the postmodern critique of his neo-transcendental argument for stipulation (ii). 146 Michelman, then, leaves us with a firm
belief in strong dialogic politics, but without normative standards to critique the political dialogue.
III. POSTMODERN CRITICAL THEORY?
When Michelman confronts the need to generate a critical standard for
his theory of strong dialogic politics, he offers a neo-transcendental argument to justify his proposed norm of nondistortion and inclusiveness. The
persistence of power and its distortive effects, however, ultimately under145. One sentence, however, makes this weakest reading especially problematic. Near the
conclusion of his discussion of Winter's experientialist theory and the prereflective cognitive
structures, Michelman writes: "Winter joins Habermas." Radin & Michelman, supra note
112, at 1043. Michelman had turned to a Habermasian argument not to defend dialogic
politics, but to generate a normative standard, stipulation (ii). Hence, when Michelman
writes that Winter joins Habermas, it suggests that Michelman intends his discussion of
Winter and the prereflective cognitive structures to relate to stipulation (ii), and not only to
his belief in strong dialogic politics.
146. I do not mean to suggest, however, that Michelman has admitted that stipulation (ii)
is indefensible. Perhaps Michelman's best response to the postmodern critique of stipulation (ii) is his initial, brief, and pragmatic response. Immediately after acknowledging the
postmodern problem of the constancy of coercion and exclusion, Michelman writes: "To the
pragmatist temperament, no such purely conceptual bind can be terminal to the practical
pursuit of democratic, collective self-government. The pragmatist may still find it right to
pursue the issue of the social and cultural conditions of self-government for all-universallythrough democratic politics." Id. at 1041. Nonetheless, Michelman admits that this pragmatist response alone is not sufficient. Thus, in the next sentence, he writes: "Still, the
question left by deconstruction cannot honestly or intelligently be ignored. Where can we
possibly hope to find the unprescribed yet predialogic 'community' required for undominated dialogue?" Id. at 1041-42. He then launches into his ambiguous discussion of the
prereflective cognitive structures.
Although much of my proposed alternative approach is pragmatic, see infra text accompanying notes 147-181, the content of pragmatism itself is controversial. For example, some
pragmatists argue that theory is irrelevant to practice. See AGAINST THEORY: LITERARY
STUDIES AND THE NEW PRAGMATISM (W.J.T. Mitchell ed., 1985); Fish, Dennis Martinez,
supra note 34, at 1777-79. I clearly do not reject theory, although I do not argue that theory
controls or governs practice. As Culler writes: "Theoretical enquiry does not lead to new
foundations-in this sense the pragmatists are right. But they are wrong to reject it on these
grounds, for it does lead to changes in assumptions, institutions, and practices." JONATHAN
CULLER, ON DECONSTRUCTION

154 (1982).
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mine his argument, leaving us with the following question: At least in the
limited context of American constitutionalism, is postmodern critical theory possible?
Whereas most forms of thought and action tend to reproduce themselves,' 4 7 the distinctive quality of postmodern thought and action is its
reflexive self-production. Postmodern theorists realize that our forms of
thought and action are historically and culturally contingent and that those
forms constantly regenerate themselves through our own words, thoughts,
and actions. 148 If postmodern critical theory is possible, its critical force
must lie in this reflexive (that is, self-reflective) generative power of
postmodernism itself.1 49 Prereflective or unconscious prejudices and interests, produced by layer upon layer of sedimented cultural traditions, often
structure our understanding and communication.1 5 ° A postmodern critical
theory must facilitate our penetration and understanding of these sedimented layers of tradition, thus raising to the surface of consciousness at
least some of our tacit prejudices and interests. 5 '
147. A form of thought or action that does not reproduce itself does not continue to exist
for very long. See Feldman, New Metaphysics, supra note 15, at 688-90 (discussing the
reconstruction of tradition). Pierre Schlag emphasizes that "normative legal thought" tends
to reproduce itself unknowingly. See, e.g., Schlag, supra note 8; Pierre Schlag, Normativity
and the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 801 (199f). For the most part, I agree with
Schlag's observations about normative legal thought, but I disagree with the implication that
normative legal thought is somehow unique because of its self-generative quality. See
Feldman, supra note 7.
148. Cf. Sanford Levinson & J.M. Balkin, Law, Music, and Other PerformingArts, 139 U.
PA. L. REV. 1597, 1639 (1991) (noting that postmodern thought is self-referential in that the
focus on culture increasingly becomes the culture itself).
149. Cf J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743, 764-67
(1987) (arguing that deconstruction can be critical theory); JACQUES DERRIDA, POSITIONS:
INTERVIEW WITH JEAN-LOUIS HOUBEDINE AND GuY SCARPETTE, in POSITIONS 93 (Alan Bass
trans., 1981) (arguing that deconstruction is not neutral, rather it intervenes); Thompson,
supra note 49, at 131 (questioning whether critical social theory must be grounded in the
sense that Habermas seeks to do). Derrida explains:
The activity or productivity connoted by the a of diffirance refers to the generative movement in the play of differences. The latter are neither fallen from the sky
nor inscribed once and for all in a closed system, a static structure that a synchronic
and taxonomic operation could exhaust. Differences are the effects of transformations, and from this vantage the theme of difftrance is incompatible with the static,
synchronic, taxonomic, ahistoric motifs in the concept of structure.
DERRIDA, supra, at 27.

For discussions of the relationship between deconstruction and
hermeneutics, see JOHN D. CAPUTO, RADICAL HERMENEUTICS 63-65 (1987); David Hoy,
Jacques Derrida, in THE RETURN OF GRAND THEORY IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES 41, 50-54
(Quentin Skinner ed., 1985); MADISON, supra note 33, at 113-15.
150. See Feldman, supra note 5 (focusing on the pervasiveness of unconscious racism in
American society); Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322-23 (1987) (exploring the development of unconscious racism).
151. Jonathan Culler explains: "The works we allude to as 'theory' are those that have
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At that point of consciousness, however, we do not suddenly escape our
cultural traditions; rather, we become capable of reflexively or critically
participating in their reconstruction. 15 2 Thus, autonomy-as understood

in postmodern terms-lies not in our disengagement from the constraints
of community and tradition. Instead, autonomy is constituted by our
conscious participation with others in tradition. Criticism is possible only
because we participate in cultural traditions that generate critical standards.
From this perspective, the vitality of communal diversity emerges quite
clearly. On the one hand, hearing the diverse voices of others encourages
us to recognize the contingency of our own prejudices and interests, while
on the other hand, we more easily appreciate the value of our own
uniqueness in the community.' 5 3 Difference is as central as consensus to
building community.
In the context of the dialogic politics of American constitutionalism, a
critical standard emerges from the civic republican tradition itself-the
common good. Michelman, following other theorists,15 4 conceives of the
had the power to make strange the familiar and to make readers conceive of their own
thinking, behavior, and institutions in new ways." CULLER, supra note 146, at 9; see
BENHABIB, supra note 49, at 281-83 (discussing self-reflexivity); id. at 336-37 (linking critical
social theory with psychoanalytic theory).
Gadamer's stance on critical theory and his position in postmodernism are controversial.
See supra note 33. Insofar as Gadamer's critics accurately describe him as failing to explain
the possibility of critique, displaying conservative tendencies by emphasizing tradition, or
becoming idealistic by emphasizing language, see, e.g., BRENKMAN, supra note 12, at 30-38;
cf. WARNKE, supra note 33, at 91, 99 (questioning whether Gadamer conservatively accepts
tradition), I depart from his position. See Feldman, supra note 4, at 705-31 (suggesting that
Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics can be synthesized with and supplemented by the
civic republican common good); Feldman, New Metaphysics, supra note 15, at 697-98 (arguing
that Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics should not be rejected as irrelevant to constitutional jurisprudence but may nonetheless need to be supplemented).
152. Thus, I am not performing what Stanley Fish has called "anti-foundationalist theory
hope." FISH, supra note 90, at 438. That is, I am not arguing that once we realize that there
are no objective foundations for understanding, we are then free of all constraints. See
DERRIDA, supra note 90, at 16 (on the privileging of consciousness). Foucault urges that the
very concept of liberation is misleading because it suggests that one can somehow be set free
to pursue one's true nature. Instead, we should emphasize that we must decide or define our
practices of freedom. Fornet-Betancourt et al., supra note 102, at 2-3.
153. According to Benhabib, reflection involves "the discursive ability to enter into
processes of argumentation and to entertain the standpoint of others." BENHABIB, supra
note 49, at 345-46. Drucilla Cornell argues that the philosophy of the limit (which is her
name for deconstruction) is "driven by an ethical desire to enact the ethical relation....
[B]y the ethical relation I mean to indicate aspiration to a nonviolent relationship to the
Other, and to otherness more generally, that assumes responsibility to guard the Other
against the appropriation that would deny her difference and singularity." DRUCILLA
CORNELL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE LIMIT 62 (1992); see COLES, supra note 140, at 75-98
(describing how Foucault suggests an ethics that would direct us to the limits or edge of our
being where we face the other).
154. See Feldman, supra note 4, at 694-95 (discussing the framers' concept of an objective
common good).
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common good as objective and, thus, tends to dismiss it as he develops his
strong dialogic politics. But the historical development of civic republicanism-from Aristotle to Machiavelli to the framers to the new republicansreveals that the objectivist quality of the common good is historically and
culturally contingent. 11 5 This recognition, together with our participation
in postmodernism, allows us now to reconceive or reconstruct the common
good as a postmodern interpretive concept. Significantly, this postmodern
"move" does not require us to change an objective common good into an
interpretive one, but rather it allows us to participate in the reconstruction
of the concept of the common good.' 56 That is, by reflexively penetrating
the layers of the civic republican tradition, we are able to reveal the
contingency of the objective common good and then to raise to a conscious
level the interpretive quality of the common good, which previously remained unseen.' 5 7
Thus, as in traditional civic republicanism, to critically evaluate political
deliberations, we must ask whether the dialogue pursued and identified
155. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. For treatment of the development of civic
republicanism, see J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT (1975); BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967); GORDON WOOD,
THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969); Feldman, supra note 4, at
682-701 (discussing the civic republican revival).
156. See LYOTARD, supra note 1, at 54-55, 60-65 (exploring the nature of postmodern or
paradigm moves or shifts); SARUP, supra note 45, at 125 (same).
157. Because postmodern interpretivism holds that all concepts are interpretive-that we
are always and already interpreting whenever we turn to a text or text-analogue-the
common good theoretically always has been an interpretive concept. We just did not know
it. See Feldman, supra note 4, at 714-24.
I am using the concept of interpretation in a broad sense. That is, interpretation includes
situations in which we consciously reflect on the meaning of something and situations in
which the meaning of something is interpreted or understood before reflection. Thus,
prereflective or unconscious prejudices and interests structure our understanding and communication because we are always and already interpreting. On this point, I disagree with those
Wittgensteinian pragmatists who insist that interpretation must involve conscious reflection,
while understanding involves prereflective meaning. See Richard Shusterman, Beneath Interpretation: Against Hermeneutic Holism, 73 MONIST 181, 190 (1990) (asserting that interpretation involves "conscious thought and deliberate reflection;" understanding is "prereflective
and immediate"); Tully, supra note 90, at 192-200.
Finally, to be absolutely clear, transforming the common good in practice is not simply a
matter of willful reimagination. Rather, the contingent social practices of our postmodern
communal traditions enable us to participate in the reconstruction of the common good. Of
course, while postmodern theories have sufficiently permeated university hallways to allow or
enable academics to talk, think, and act in this manner, it is far less likely that broader
cultural practices have similarly transformed many people outside of academics (at least at
this point in time). Nonetheless, it is a mistake to believe that academics are somehow
magically divorced from the rest of society. To the contrary, the postmodernism that is
currently filtering through academics is part of a broader postmodern trend that manifests
itself in different ways throughout society. In fact, these various manifestations arguably
represent one way to "define" postmodernism. See generally CONNOR, supra note 14;
HARVEY, supra note 14; JAMESON, supra note 14.
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the common good, but the common good is now a postmodern interpretive
concept. 15 8 By reflexively reconstructing the common good in this manner,
we structure our political attitudes to become suspicious of any claim to
have defined the common good (objective or otherwise). We understand,
in postmodernism, that power is always and already present-that every
meaning, every moment of consensus, rests in part on distortion and the
exclusion of particular prejudices, interests, and participants. With this
persistence of power-of distortion and exclusion-brought to the surface,
we question why these particular prejudices, interests, and participants are
the ones to be denied or oppressed. This questioning or suspicion does
not imply that we never can agree on the meaning of the common good,
but that any agreement is temporary-a moment in an ongoing political
dialogue. The postmodern structure of the interpretive common good
generates political dialogue.1 59 We remain always open to the possibility
of reexamining and reconstructing the common good, open to the diversity
of interests, prejudices, and participants within the community. 6 '
158. Elsewhere, I have referred to this synthesis of the civic republican common good and
postmodern interpretivism as "republican interpretivism." Feldman, supra note 4, at 714;
see id. at 714-31 (developing the synthesis of republican interpretivism); see also Feldman,
supra note 3, at 1349-56 (same).
159. The following passage from Joel Weinsheimer, drawing on Gadamer, suggests how
the common good can generate dialogue and encourage us to question our prejudices by
providing a focal point for conversation that all participants potentially care about. Weinsheimer explains:
Before false prejudices can be avoided ... they must be made conscious, and that
happens when they are provoked and irritated. Now, if we do not care what the
other person is saying, if we think of him as only airing his opinions which we (like
an analyst with his patient) want merely to understand, then nothing he can say will
provoke us. By contrast, only if we too care about what is being said, only if we
have acknowledged the other's truth claim and think of him as concerned with
something that concerns us too-only if in fact he is addressing us-can we become
irritated and our prejudices be aroused into consciousness ....
The point is that if
we trust to method and maintain a disinterested aloofness, we have not at all
eliminated our prejudices but rather universally affirmed them, for we have rendered them immune to provocation and placed them out of jeopardy. Thus we keep
safe even our false prejudices. Only if we are interested can our prejudices be
challenged, and what interests us above all is truth.
WEINSHEIMER, supra note 33, at 180; cf BERNSTEIN, supra note 44, at 183-84 (arguing that
Derridean deconstruction does not reject making distinctions and having hierarchies, but
urges us to constantly question distinctions, hierarchies, and authority in general).
160. See RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, Reconciliation/Rupture, in THE NEW CONSTELLATION,

supra note 33, at 293, 307 (asserting that experience, including understanding, is always open
and never completes itself); Sabina Lovibond, Feminism and Postmodernism, in POSTMODERNISM AND SOCIETY 154, 157-58 (Roy Boyne & Ali Rattansi eds., 1990) (arguing that postmodern conversation aims at continuation, not closure, with periodic episodes of agreement and
disagreement). According to Lyotard:
[A]ny consensus on the rules defining a game and the "moves" playable within it
must be local, in other words, agreed on by its present players and subject to
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Moreover, not only is every claim to fix the definition of the common
good suspect, even our fundamental commitment to the common good
itself must remain open to question.' 6 1 In short, the interpretation (or
reconstruction) of American constitutionalism never ends. We consequently reunite two components of the civic republican tradition: deliberative politics and the common good. Only now, we realize that these two
components do not stand tensely opposed, rather they are dialectically
linked in a postmodern interpretive circle.' 6 2 The substantive goal of
identifying a common good generates political dialogue, while the process
the common good. Process and substance
of political dialogue generates
1 63
collapse into each other.
Conceiving of the common good as a postmodern interpretive concept,
however, triggers certain problematic questions: What is the interpretive
common good? What does it mean? How can such a nebulous concept
muster the critical bite to serve as a normative standard? These questions,
though, do not undermine the critical potential of the interpretive common good. To the contrary, they underscore that the paradoxical quality
eventual cancellation. The orientation then favors a multiplicity of finite metaarguments, by which I mean argumentation that concerns metaprescriptives and is
limited in space and time.
LYOTARD, supra note

1, at 66.
In writing about deconstruction and Derrida, Sarup comments: "According to deconstructionists there is nothing other than interpretation. As there is neither an undifferentiated
nor a literal bottom or ground, the activity of interpretation is endless." SARUP, supra note
45, at 60 (footnote omitted).
161. James Tully writes: "We can learn from Habermas's mistake, therefore, an important feature of our political language-games of critical reflection: We question and alter the
rules of the games as we go along." Tully, supra note 90, at 188 (footnote omitted).
162. I draw here on the concept of the hermeneutic circle:
In its simplest form, the hermeneutic circle underscores a relationship between a
text and its constituent parts: an interpreter can understand a whole text only by
understanding its parts, yet an interpreter can understand the parts only by anticipating an understanding of the whole. An elaborated hermeneutic circle, however,
brings within its scope the complex interactions between interpreter, text, and
tradition (or interpretive community). Interpretation has two sides: on the one
side, tradition limits the vision of the interpreter as he or she approaches the text,
yet on the other side, tradition does not exist unless people constantly create and
recreate it through the interpretive process itself. The latter side emphasizes that
tradition is created as an ever new meaning of the text comes into being: as we
participate in tradition by interpreting texts, we transform and reconstitute that
tradition. The two sides of interpretation are not separate and do not function
independently, rather they are simultaneous and interrelated. They resonate together as meaning comes into being within the hermeneutic circle.
Feldman, supra note 4, at 711-12 (footnotes omitted); see also GADAMER, supra note 33, at
291 (discussing the hermeneutic circle).
163. Cf. Feldman, supra note 51, at 242 (examining the tension between process and
substance in modern constitutional law).
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of the interpretive common good is its postmodern virtue. 164 While the
interpretive common good always has a determinate meaning in each
concrete situation, no mechanical process or method can reveal that
meaning.1 65 Instead, its meaning must come into being through a political
dialogue that should never end because of the persistence of distortion
and exclusion. The interpretive common good thus refutes closure; it
invites dissension; it generates dialogue. The interpretive common good
provides the focal point for swirling political deliberations, in which diversity precipitates cracking open traditions as the community strains to find
the truth of the common good in the Constitution.
Although distortion and exclusion inhere in dialogue, not all traditions
and communities are equally distortive and exclusive. The political dialogue over the meaning of the interpretive common good provides the
opportunity to build community, welcoming previously excluded or oppressed prejudices, interests, and participants. As we struggle to define
the common good through political dialogue, we open ourselves to recognize the bonds of tradition within the community-the common interests
that we already share. Yet, as we interpret and hence reconstruct the
meaning of the common good, we simultaneously reconstruct the communal traditions that were already given to us, therefore reconstructing and
transforming our prejudices and interests, which in turn will shape our
future understanding, communication, and interaction. In sum, we participate in reconstructing our communities and ourselves, and in so doing, we
open our communities and selves to receive new prejudices, interests, and
participants. 166 At the same time, we can never genuinely claim to achieve
a completely undistorted and inclusive political dialogue or decision.
Thus, we recognize that true communal conflicts exist-we hear the dispar-

164. Cf. BENHABIB, supra note 49, at 243 ("The interpretive indeterminacy of social action

is not an ontological shortcoming, but its constitutive feature."). To some extent, Martha
Nussbaum's description of the Aristotelian virtues resembles my notion of the interpretive
common good. Nussbaum writes that the virtues are "normative but relatively empty ... of
concrete moral content." Martha C. Nussbaum, Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach, 13 MIDWEST STUDIES PHILOSOPHY 32, 38 (Peter A. French et al. eds., 1988).

Similarly, the interpretive common good is normative but has a determinate meaning only in
concrete and practical situations.

Much of Nussbaum's Aristotelian theory is appealing,

although her endorsement of philosophical realism seems unnecessary and misleading. See
generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, Sophistry About Conventions, in LOVE'S KNOWLEDGE 220,
228-29 (1990); cf. Feldman, New Metaphysics, supra note 15, at 690-92 (distinguishing

philosophical realism and interpretivism).
165. Gadamer intended the title of his major work, Truth and Method, to be ironic. He
argued for the possibility of truth, but through the interpretive process and not through
method. See GADAMER, supra note 33, at xxi, 295, 309.
166. In a sense, I am arguing that the interpretive common good can provide the
anticipatory-utopian moment that Benhabib says is lacking in Habermas. See BENHABIB,
supra note 49, at 277-78.
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ate voices and their diverse interests-and consequently, we are better
moral and constitutional issues that we, as
able to understand the difficult
167
a community, must decide.
At this stage of the argument, a highlighting of the similarities and
differences between this postmodern interpretive approach and Michelman's neo-transcendental approach is instructive. 168 The obvious, though
crucial, distinction is that Michelman still views the common good as
objective and, thus, subordinates it in his dialogic politics, while the
postmodern approach reconstructs and then emphasizes the common good
as interpretive. Nonetheless, both approaches similarly start with an initial
conception of American constitutionalism that is given through tradition,
and then both seek to reconstruct the meaning of that given conception of
American constitutionalism so as to draw out a critical component. Only
the postmodern interpretivist approach, however, underscores that our
initial conception of American constitutionalism is itself an interpretive
understanding of tradition arising from our prejudices and interests. Therefore, the postmodern reconstruction or interpretation of American constitutionalism simply continues the process of interpretive understanding of
our constitutional traditions-a process that necessarily is already under
way as soon as one turns to the question of how to define or reconstruct
American constitutionalism. In other words, a postmodern interpretivist
approach refuses to assume a relatively stable or uncontested starting
point, which is inherent in a neo-transcendental argument. 1 69 Thus, in
postmodernism one cannot delineate any preconditions or presuppositions
for some noncontingent American constitutionalism; rather, one particithe meaning of American constitutionalism
pates in the dialogue over
170
less.
no
more,
itself-no
Michelman's neo-transcendentalism, therefore, tends to mask the true
points of dispute in the American political dialogue. The meaning of
American constitutionalism is anything but stable or uncontested. It will
vary wildly depending upon whom one asks: a white Anglo-Saxon Protestant male, whose ancestors voluntarily arrived in North America over
three hundred years ago, an African-American female, whose ancestors
were forced to come to the United States two hundred years ago, or a
167. Cf. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 90-109 (1982) (ethic of caring is based
on creating and maintaining relationships, and many ethical questions create difficult problems because possible resolutions may harm others).
168. See supra note 65 (characterizing Michelman's argument as a rational reconstruction,
not a pure transcendental argument).
169. See supra text accompanying notes 93-100.
170. See generally BENHABIB, supra note 49, at 267 (suggesting that Habermas's effort to
distance rational reconstructions from transcendental arguments collapses rational reconstructions into "hermeneutic-narrative" accounts).

2284

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 81:2243

first-generation Jewish male, whose parents survived the Nazi Holocaust.
To Michelman, American constitutionalism might rest on two commitments-self-government and government by law-but to others, American
constitutionalism means the ideological legitimation of economic oppression.
And yet to others, it means little more than some platitudes remembered
from fifth grade social studies and repetitive political commercials during
quadrennial presidential campaigns. 171 Hence, as the postmodern interpretive approach emphasizes, the American political dialogue is precisely
about the meaning of American constitutionalism: any approach, such as
Michelman's neo-transcendentalism, that diminishes this essential point
denigrates the significance of the diversity that emerges as so integral to
postmodern political deliberation.
Furthermore, whereas a focus on the interpretive common good reflexively reminds us of the possibility of opening the political dialogue and
community, Michelman's neo-transcendental argument ironically (in light
of Michelman's professed civic republican goals) undermines the building
of the political community. By assuming a relatively stable definition of
American constitutionalism, Michelman obscures the opportunity presented by political dialogue to reconstruct our community and its traditions and to welcome previously excluded or oppressed prejudices, interests,
and participants. A stabilized American constitutionalism alienates those
individuals and groups who disagree with the currently accepted meaning
exactly when they should be invited to express their discordant views.
Those divergent individuals and groups thus are often thrust to a nearpermanent status at the margin or totally outside of the political community and dialogue.17 2
Finally, an analysis of Bowers v. Hardwick'7 3 illustrates the significance

171. Recognizing and empathizing with the views of others is the point of Mari Matsuda's
suggestion that we "look to the bottom." See Mari J. Matsuda, Looking To the Bottom:
CriticalLegal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 324-25 (1987).
172. According to Rorty:
Since Kant, philosophers have hoped [to find] the a priori structure of any possible
inquiry, or language, or form of social life. If we give up this hope, we shall lose
what Nietzsche called "metaphysical comfort," but we may gain a renewed sense of
community. Our identification with our community-our society, our political
tradition, our intellectual heritage-is heightened when we see this community as
ours rather than nature's, shaped rather than found, one among many which men
have made.
RORTY, Pragmatism,supra note 90, at 166.

Benhabib explains, "A common, shared perspective is one that we create insofar as in
acting with others we discover our difference and identity, our distinctiveness from, and
unity with, others. The emergence of such unity-in-difference comes through a process of
self-transformation and collective action." BENHABIB, supra note 49, at 348.
173. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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of the distinctions between postmodern interpretivism and Michelman's
neo-transcendentalism. As already discussed, the Supreme Court held in
Hardwick that the state of Georgia's criminal conviction of Hardwick for
performing homosexual sodomy in his own home did not violate his
constitutional right of privacy."' When Michelman analyzes Hardwick, he
concludes that the Court's decision violates his critical norm of nondistortion and inclusiveness: in effect, Georgia coercively excluded homosexuals
from the political dialogue that is central to civic republican government.1 75
This conclusion is correct, but it misses the central issue in Hardwick:
whether homosexuals should be coercively excluded from the political
dialogue. Michelman's neo-transcendental approach assumes that everyone should be allowed to participate fully, but that assumption is exactly
what the case questions. The majority of the Supreme Court Justices and
their supporters expressly or implicitly reject homosexuals as full members
of the political community. For that reason, the Court emphasizes that a
state can legislate morality-that it was constitutional 176
for Georgia to
unacceptable.'
and
"immoral
sodomy
homosexual
declare
The postmodern interpretive approach, emphasizing the common good,
focuses on this key issue and suggests that the Court wrongly decided the
case. To critically evaluate the decision, we must ask whether the state law
promotes the interpretive common good as it is expressed in the right of
privacy. Because of conscious and unconscious prejudices against homosexuals-with the Georgia antisodomy statute representing but one manifestation of those prejudices-many homosexuals are forced either to separate
their lives into sharply distinct spheres, hiding sexual preferences and
partners from family, friends, and coworkers, or to experience life as the
"other" if they choose to openly display their sexual preferences. This
experience of difference based on sexual preferences strongly supports
including homosexuals fully within the political community: they have a
unique perspective or voice to contribute to the political dialogue in
pursuit of the common good. The positive value of diverse voices in a
political dialogue aimed at the interpretive common good cannot be overstated. Whereas the smug consensus of the majority threatens to abort
dialogue, to stilt decisionmaking, and to urge undue conformity, the divergent voices of homosexuals encourage us to question our own interests and
prejudices, to penetrate the layers of tradition that unconsciously shape
our views, and to transform self-interest into public interest. 177 Based on

174. Id. at 195-96.
175.
176.
177.
special

See supra text accompanying notes 76-80.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 196.
Matsuda explains that "those who have experienced discrimination speak with a
voice to which we should listen." Matsuda, supra note 171, at 324; see also Robin
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this reasoning, we can reasonably conclude that a law that coercively
excludes homosexuals undermines the communal effort to understand the
meaning of the common good.
But this initial conclusion cannot end the conversation. Communal
traditions and political dialogue always involve some degree of distortion
and exclusion, and certainly the Georgia antisodomy law coercively excludes homosexuals (and hence their prejudices and interests) from full
participation. But if the Court had held the law unconstitutional, then
would not some other people's prejudices and interests be forcefully or
coercively discounted, if not excluded? In particular, this case requires us
to choose whether to minimize, on the one hand, the interests and the
voices of homosexuals, or on the other hand, the interests and the voices of
(mostly) heterosexuals who want to exclude homosexuals.17 8 This case, in
other words, squarely presents the central issue of American constitutionalism: how will we define (reconstruct) the meaning of the political community, the political dialogue, and American constitutionalism?
Put in these terms, we still can argue strongly that the antisodomy
statute undermines the common good and, thus, should have been held
unconstitutional. As already discussed, homosexuals can contribute a
uniquely valuable voice to the political dialogue exactly because they so
often are discriminated against due to their sexual preferences. If their
voices are minimized or silenced, then the political community loses certain prejudices and interests-a particular perspective-that no other
individual or group can similarly contribute. With regard to those heterosexuals who would exclude homosexuals, however, their voice is unique,
but only because of their particular interest in this situation. Their heterosexuality does not cause them to endure pervasive discrimination or to
have any other unusual experiences that would generate a special perspective or voice that could contribute uniquely to political dialogue. Consequently, the political dialogue in pursuit of the common good would be
enriched if homosexuals were invited to participate fully, even though
some other interests and voices would necessarily be forcefully subordinated.
Barnes, Race Consciousness: The Thematic Content of Racial Distinctiveness in CriticalRace
Scholarship, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1864, 1869-70 (1990) (emphasizing the development of a
different voice based on status as racial minority); Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal
Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 872 (1990) ("The experience of being a victim ... reveals

truths about reality that non-victims do not see"); Delgado, supra note 108, at 2413 (arguing
that storytelling can destroy one's mindset); Feldman, supra note 5, at 1865-66 (stating that

diverse voices enrich dialogue and improve decisionmaking); supra note 140 and accompanying text.
178. Cf. Michelman, PornographyRegulation, supra note 5, at 306-09 (noting how constitutional dispute over antipornography legislation presents a choice between silencing pornogra-

phers or silencing women).

19931

THE PERSISTENCE OF POWER

2287

Furthermore, this argument can be related directly to the constitutional
right of privacy. Postmodern interpretivism reveals that the individual and
the community are dialectically intermingled.1 79 Each individual always
remains situated within a community and its traditions, which simultaneously enable and constrain one's ability to communicate and interact-to be, in short, a person. Yet, the community and its traditions
continue to exist only insofar as they constantly are constructed and
reconstructed through concrete individual acts, words, and thoughts. The
constitutional right of privacy, therefore, cannot be envisioned coherently
as merely protecting a private sphere of values and preferences, sexual or
otherwise, from external or communal interference. To the contrary,
so-called private preferences and values exist only because the individual
participates in the community and its traditions. Thus, the right of privacy
should protect one's ability to participate in the broad range of social
interactions, including political dialogue, that constitutively develop one's
personality. When privacy is viewed in this way, the antisodomy statute in
Hardwick is revealed not only to have denied Hardwick the possibility of
(legal) intimate sexual relationships that are central to one's personal
development, but also to have diminished Hardwick's ability to participate
fully in the political dialogue of the community, which also significantly
influences the development of one's personality.
Moreover, as already discussed, the statute prevents homosexuals from
contributing their unique voices to the political dialogue, thus denying to
others the benefits of hearing divergent perspectives. Consequently, the
antisodomy statute of Georgia contravenes the common good because it
cripples all individuals within the community as they struggle to reflexively
understand and reconstruct themselves and their community."'
Finally, it is important to remember that whatever decision the Court
reaches in a case like Hardwick, it does not terminate the political dialogue.
The Court is but one participant in an ongoing dialogue in which the
community and its members constantly reconstruct traditions, including
179. My argument here corresponds to Michelman's argument about the connection of
privacy and citizenship. See supra text accompanying notes 79-80.
180. Cf KAI T. ERICKSON, WAYWARD PURITANS: A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE 10-13 (1966) (arguing that the deviant actor helps a community to define and highlight
its shifting boundaries). See generally STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE (1990) (arguing that dissent is a key element of American tradition).
I do not mean to suggest that all groups that are systematically discriminated against
should necessarily be given constitutional protection. For example, whereas homosexuals
can offer a voice that challenges a dominant political group or outlook, the Nazis who wished
to march in Skokie, Illinois, sought to inflict emotional harm on an already oppressed
religious group. That is, the Nazis sought to close the community to a group that already was
at the margins. See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1206-07 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
916 (1978).
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the common
good. The dialogue may pause momentarily, but it should
181
never end.
CONCLUSION

As one of the leaders of the civic republican revival, Frank Michelman
has developed a powerful conception of strong dialogic politics. Nonetheless, because Michelman's views correspond with postmodern theories,
especially philosophical hermeneutics, he inevitably encounters a central
difficulty of postmodern thought: the problem of critique. His imaginative
response, following Habermas's neo-transcendental reasoning, is to inquire into the preconditions of American constitutionalism. Michelman
concludes that we can critically evaluate political dialogue by demanding
that it be undistorted and communally inclusive.
He eventually realizes, though, that at this stage of his argument he has
underestimated the persistence of power. In particular, Michelman recognizes that dialogue depends upon one's participation in a community and
its traditions, yet one does not freely choose one's community. In effect,
then, communal traditions forcefully limit one's ability to communicate
and interact with others. Michelman, in a rather opaque passage, suggests
that a possible response to this postmodern dilemma lies in Steven Winter's application of an experientialist theory of cognition and meaning to
law.18 This passage is open to at least three readings, but if it is to be read
as an effort to save Michelman's proposed critical standard, then it must
mean that, according to Michelman, we all share certain prereflective
cognitive structures that create the possibility for undistorted and inclusive
political dialogue. 83 This final effort by Michelman to evade the pitfalls of
postmodern interpretivism (if it is such an effort) nonetheless runs aground,
seriously undermining the core themes of his strong dialogic politics. Not
only do the prereflective cognitive structures fail to eliminate distortion
and exclusion, but also Michelman's argument ultimately seems to encourage undue conformity and consensus, thus draining the community of the
diversity necessary for genuine political dialogue.
If postmodern critical theory is possible, its critical force must arise from
the reflexive self-production that distinguishes postmodern thought and
action. In the context of American constitutionalism, we can locate this
181. See Feldman, supra note 4, at 722-31 (describing how the Court is but one participant

in a communal dialogue over the interpretive common good). Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973), starkly illustrates how a Supreme Court decision can actually generate political
dialogue. See Feldman, supra note 3, at 1356 ("That the Court sometimes generates heated

debates ... underscores its significant role in constituting and reconstituting values, culture,
and community.").
182. See supra notes 115-116 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 124-146 and accompanying text.
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force in a reconstructed civic republicanism that emphasizes a political
dialogue in pursuit of an interpretive common good. By underscoring that
distortion and exclusion are always part of community, tradition, and
dialogue-that some prejudices, interests, and participants are always
subordinated-this postmodern interpretivist approach encourages (or
structures) us to reflexively confront the question of how we are to participate in the constant reconstruction of our community and ourselves.
Yet at this conclusion to the argument, we must return to the beginning-to the opposition between civic republicanism and political pluralism.
If, as is argued, a postmodern interpretivist form of civic republicanism
emphasizes that certain prejudices, interests, and participants are always
forcefully subordinated or excluded in the political dialogue, then how
does civic republicanism ultimately differ from pluralism? Is politics once
again envisioned as no more than a self-interested conflict among individuals and groups, with some winning and some losing? In short, what
distinguishes this postmodern interpretivist approach as civic republican?
There are three related answers to this question. First, and quite
simply, individuals and groups are supposedly prohibited from baldly
arguing self-interest: they must at least phrase their political positions so
that they appear to go beyond the satisfaction of their own personal
interests. Second, the conclusion of a political dialogue theoretically does
not depend on the accumulation of raw political power, but on the best
understanding of the common good. Third, postmodern interpretivism
introduces the prospect that the apparent losers in the political dialogue
do not actually or personally experience a loss. Instead, postmodern
interpretivism opens the possibility that all participants in the dialogue had
their prejudices and interests transformed or reconstructed to correspond
to the public interest or common good. At that point of transformation-if it is ever achieved-we arguably could conclude that no participant is coerced or dominated because all are in consensus.
But isn't this exactly where Michelman entered? He asked what conditions could create the experience of having one's prejudices and interests
fairly and freely reconstructed-what conditions could legitimate a consensus. But Michelman's formulation of these very questions led him astray.
In the first place, nothing outside the practice and experience of political
dialogue in self-government can legitimate that practice and experience.
Only the continuing actual practice and experience of political dialogue in
self-government can legitimate itself. And in the second place, even if we
were able to achieve that idealized moment of consensus, distortion and
exclusion would nonetheless remain. Distortion and exclusion exist without winners and losers. That is, even if no one intentionally subordinates
others and no one experiences loss as a victim, communal traditions still
continue to forcefully constrain us. Even when all participants to a conver-
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sation reach a consensus on some issue, they are then limited to understanding or seeing that single acceptable conclusion.
But more important, no matter how close we might come, we never do
achieve that idealized moment of consensus-some prejudices, interests,
and participants are always subordinated or excluded. Before all participants ever agree on the conclusion to any one issue, some other issue
begins to advance to the forefront. But then, do we not again return to
pluralism, in which some individuals and groups are winners and some are
losers?
What emerges from this postmodern deconstructive circle (around and
around go pluralism and civic republicanism) is that perhaps the difference
between pluralists and postmodern republicans is their view of this circle.
The pluralist stops with the pluralist conclusion-that some individuals
and groups are always self-interested winners and losers-and thus discovers pluralist assumptions and themes. But the postmodern civic republican continues around the circle by asking how we might get beyond
self-interest. Postmodern interpretivism insists that human motivations
are too confused and complex to reduce to a single force, whether it is
self-interest, the pursuit of the common good, or anything else. From this
perspective, postmodern civic republicanism-in the form of the interpretive common good-becomes a normative ideal that keeps us going around
the circle, reaching for a possibility.

